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ABSTRACT
A NATIVIST UPSURGE:
KENTUCKY’S KNOW NOTHING PARTY OF THE 1850s
Eric B. Brumfield
May 20, 2016
This thesis analyzes the rise and fall of the Know Nothing Party in Kentucky. Beginning
with the presidential election of 1844, this thesis traces the decline of the Whig Party and
the growth of nativism in the mid-nineteenth century. In addition to the political shift, the
thesis explores the growing immigration numbers of the 1840s and 1850s and the antiCatholicism that propelled nativist attitudes. While the issue of slavery sank the national
Whig Party, this thesis argues that the failure to address concerns over immigration and
naturalization largely led to the party’s downfall in Kentucky. Destroying the second
party system, a myriad of political concerns gravitated under the Know Nothing banner,
including Unionism, temperance, public schooling, and anti-party sentiment. This thesis
argues that fervent nativists and anti-party voters felt particularly betrayed as old-line
Kentucky Whigs pushed aside longtime nativists for nominations on the Know Nothing
ticket.
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INTRODUCTION
EXAMINING KENTUCKY’S KNOW NOTHING PARTY OF THE 1850s
Enjoying only a few fleeting years as a political force, the Know Nothing Party of the
1850s presents something of an enigma in American history. Fading shortly after they
appeared, the Know Nothings swept state and gubernatorial races in 1855, only to crash
disastrously in the presidential contest the following year. Though their time on the
national stage proved short-lived, the Know Nothing movement forced the issues of
immigration and naturalization, long discounted by Democrats and many Whigs, into the
forefront of American political discourse.
Arguably the most reliably Whig state in the Union, the collapse of the party in
Kentucky signaled a major political shift. On the national stage, the debate over slavery’s
western expansion mortally wounded the Whigs. In Kentucky, however, Whig leaders’
resistance to addressing voters’ concerns about immigration, naturalization, and
temperance sounded the party’s death knell. Long before the Know Nothing Party’s 1855
apex, nativist sentiment brewed for over a decade in Kentucky and the nation. In the
electoral contests of the 1840s, Kentucky’s leading Whigs repudiated all connections
with nativist movements, including the American Republicans and the Native Americans.
As the Louisville Journal and other Whig newspapers assured readers, the Whigs
welcomed the naturalized into their party. But most naturalized citizens declined the
invitation. As their numbers grew, new arrivals provided a reliable contingent of the
Democratic Party voters, both nationally and in Kentucky.
1

With the numbers of German and Irish immigrants coming into the United States
reaching unprecedented levels, Kentucky’s Whig leadership, including Henry Clay,
refused to address the naturalization issue for fear of alienating ethnic voters. Meanwhile,
conflicts between nativist groups and immigrants broke out in a number of urban areas.
Charges of immigrant voter fraud tipping the scale in favor of the Democrats further
enraged nativist sympathizers. In the early 1850s, fervent anti-party sentiment also spread
as voters rejected the perceived ineffectiveness and cronyism of both major parties. In
addition, anti-Catholicism played a key role in the rise of American nativism.
At the core of the party’s ideology, Know Nothings believed that Protestantism
defined American society.1 Protestantism encouraged the individualism that flourished in
America, Know Nothings argued, because it allowed each Christian to interpret the Bible
personally and to pray as he or she saw fit. Know Nothings also pointed to the democratic
aspects of Protestant Christianity, in which congregations chose their own ministers. If
churchgoers disapproved of him, they could select a new one or leave the church for
another denomination. Protestants also believed their method of devotion the most
egalitarian. Even without attending church, a person could attain pious standing through
personal study of the Bible and private prayer. As Know Nothings insisted, American
reverence for democracy and freedom evolved from these Protestant practices.2
Know Nothings also maintained that Catholicism was incompatible with
America’s ideology of independence. While Protestantism was democratic, Know
Nothings viewed Catholicism as autocratic, because the pope directed all its adherents
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through bishops and priests. As one Know Nothing newspaper described the hierarchy,
“the Pope utters his wish to his Bishops, the Bishops bear it to their Priests, the Priests
direct the members of the church, and they all obey, because the Pope has a right to rule
them, they are his subjects.”3 Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism was also believed to
restrain freedom of thought. As Know Nothings charged, Catholicism inhibited the
individual autonomy that flourished under Protestantism because priests interceded
between the worshipper and God in almost every aspect of devotion. Anxiety about papal
overreach also mounted as American Protestants questioned Catholic adherence to
foreign authority. Additionally, widespread anti-Catholic literature and aggressive
responses on the part of Catholic clergy exacerbated the mid-nineteenth century debate
over immigration and naturalization.
As the culmination of decades of nativism and anti-Catholicism, the Know
Nothing Party catapulted onto the political scene in 1854 and 1855, winning an
impressive number of local, state, and Congressional races. Temporarily uniting
dissatisfied Whigs, ardent nativists, steadfast Unionists, and anti-party voters under one
banner, the Know Nothing Party enjoyed a commanding, albeit brief, success. However,
growing sectional tensions overwhelmed the party’s national organization. When
delegates at the 1855 Know Nothing’s national convention attempted to sidestep the issue
of slavery’s western expansion, northern delegates stormed out in protest.
The theme of Unionism pervaded Know Nothing ideology, especially in
Kentucky. As the slavery issue and its western expansion dominated political discourse,
Kentucky Know Nothings continued to advocate preservation of the Union. This support
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for the Union remained grounded in an unwavering adherence to the status quo in terms
of slavery. In party pamphlets and circulations, Know Nothings advocated not only
reverence for the Constitution, but complete adherence to Supreme Court decisions and
the rule of law. While Kentucky Know Nothings castigated Southern Democrats as
sectional agitators, they abhorred northern radicals and abolitionists even more. Though
both Kentucky Democrats and Know Nothings supported slavery where it existed and
opposed abolition, they stood in contrast when it came to slavery’s western expansion. As
sectional tensions heightened, Know Nothings in Kentucky opposed slavery’s expansion
on the grounds that it violated the Missouri Compromise and ignited confrontation
between proslavery and antislavery groups in the West.4
When nativist politics took center stage, Kentucky witnessed its own share of
volatility. As the 1855 gubernatorial election approached, incendiary press exchanges led
by the Louisville Journal’s influential editor, George D. Prentice, stirred animosity
between Know Nothings and naturalized Democrats. On August 6, 1855, a violent
Election Day clash, known as “Bloody Monday,” erupted between Know Nothings and
immigrants. In the wake of the riots that left an estimated twenty-two people dead, both
Know Nothings and Democrats charged the other side with inciting the violence.
Politically, Kentucky Know Nothings assumed control of the state capitol, electing
Charles S. Morehead as governor. In the long run, however, the incident undermined the
political coherence of the Know Nothing movement. The infiltration of well-established
former Whigs also undermined the party in Kentucky. As old-line Whigs in the form of
Morehead, Humphrey Marshall, and James F. Robertson assumed nominations for office
4
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under the Know Nothing banner, they underplayed nativist concerns and instead
championed traditional Whig interests. In response, fervent nativists cried foul, including
Louisville Courier editor Walter N. Haldeman, who publicly left the party in disgust.
The following year, the Know Nothing Party capsized at the national level.
Offering a vague platform of Unionism, lawfulness, and reverence to the Constitution,
Know Nothings ran former President Millard Fillmore at their helm and experienced a
crushing defeat at the ballot box. Carrying only Maryland, Know Nothings support fell
dramatically as Democrat James Buchanan won Kentucky and the presidency. Most
northern voters bolted the Know Nothing movement, supporting John C. Frémont and the
newly established Republican Party, which ran under the banner of “Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men.” In contrast, Southern voters, assured of Buchanan’s allegiance to
slaveholder interests and state’s rights, firmly allied themselves with the Democrats.
During Buchanan’s presidency, the debate over slavery’s future consumed the
nation, rendering the issues of immigration and naturalization superfluous. Similarly,
Protestant concerns over Roman Catholicism declined as voters’ allegiance either to
southern interests or the Union overshadowed religious differences. Though historians
have often portrayed the Know Nothings as a single-issue nativist crusade, the movement
also articulated the political concerns of anti-party voters, temperance and public
schooling advocates, and Unionists. The latter issue proved paramount as the Civil War
approached. The impact of the Know Nothing Party and its causes, reveals the conflicting
nature of mid-nineteenth century American political discourse. The party’s role in
capsizing the over two decade-long political second party system also proved significant
in restructuring the political map. Despite the brevity of their existence, the issues

5

advocated by the Know Nothings, including immigration, temperance, anti-partyism, and
Unionism, persisted long after the party’s national collapse.

6

CHAPTER I
AN ENTANGLED COLLAPSE: THE FALL OF KENTUCKY’S WHIG PARTY, THE
RISE OF NATIVISM, AND THE GROWTH OF ANTI-PARTY SENTIMENT
In the fall of 1850, Whig leader Henry Clay journeyed back to Lexington greatly pleased
with himself. In championing the Compromise of 1850, Clay, quite feeble at seventythree, believed he had saved the Union. Assuaging sectional passions through a series of
agreements aimed at maintaining the territorial balance between slave and free states,
Clay’s compromise succeeded in temporarily quieting the boisterous voices of secession.
As a result of his legislative success, Clay cemented his legacy as the Great
Compromiser, a moderate voice in an era of extremes. Leaving Washington, D.C., on
Saturday, September 28, 1850, Clay journeyed by railway to his home in Lexington.
Informed of Clay’s recent accomplishments, supporters gathered to cheer the old leader.
As Clay moved from one train to another, spectators offered congratulations and shouted
their appreciation across the station.5 Following Clay’s tireless congressional dealings,
however, a state of exhaustion seemed to overwhelm him. Though a number of people
wanted to shake his hand, Clay implored his supporters to respect his frail condition and
allow him to continue westward without further delay.
Upon his triumphant arrival in Lexington on October 2, an enormous crowd
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greeted Clay and escorted him to the city’s Phoenix Hotel.6 Speaking briefly to the
crowd, Clay reiterated his belief that the Union had been saved by the compromise.
Following the crowd’s hearty applause, the aged Clay lifted his arms and laboriously
pointed in the direction of his beloved estate, Ashland. “There lives an old lady about a
mile and a half from here, whom I would rather see than any of you,” remarked Clay with
a tired grin. On that final note, the crowd laughed and applauded once more, clearing the
way for the infirm leader to return home.7
Although Kentucky’s economy remained heavily steeped in the institution of
slavery in 1850, a strong Unionist sentiment rang throughout the state, most resoundingly
in Clay’s own Whig-dominated Bluegrass region. The patriotic fervor ensured the
popularity of Clay’s compromise in Kentucky, his home of fifty years and perhaps the
most ardently Whig state in the nation.8 Breathing a sigh of relief, most Kentuckians
earnestly hoped the Compromise of 1850 would provide a final settlement to the
increasingly volatile conflict between the sections.
Two weeks after the return of the Great Compromiser, on October 17, 1850,
Lexington extended Clay’s welcome with a celebratory bipartisan festival held at the
city’s fairgrounds. Though plagued with “delicate health,” Clay readily accepted the
invitation.9 Thousands attended the “Free Barbeque” held in Clay’s honor and passed six
celebratory resolutions praising Clay and his compromise while further affirming

6

Ibid., 763.
Ibid.
8
George Rawlings Poage. Henry Clay and the Whig Party (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1936), 265.
9
Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman, 764.
7

8

Kentucky’s allegiance to the Union.10 Even John C. Breckinridge, the leading voice of
Kentucky’s rival Democratic Party (and future Confederate Secretary of War), delivered
a gracious keynote speech, jubilantly toasting Clay and his efforts in preserving the
Union.
Basking in his legislative accomplishment, Clay expressed delight that
Kentuckians “were almost unanimous . . . Democrats no less than Whigs” in their support
of the compromise.11 For Clay, Kentucky’s unanimity provided welcome proof that
patriotism could indeed overcome heated partisanship and sectionalism. In his concluding
statements to the thousands gathered at Lexington’s fairgrounds, Clay repeated his hope
that the compromise would “lead to quiet and tranquility.”12 “Malcontents, at the North
and in the South,” Clay continued, “may seek to continue or revive agitation, but,
rebuked and discountenanced by the Masses, they will ultimately be silenced generally,
and induced to keep the peace!”13
As an additional sign of unity, the Kentucky legislature invited Clay to speak to a
joint session on November 15, 1850. In his speech to the state’s lawmakers, Clay
advocated several measures to ensure the preservation of the Union. Denouncing
abolitionists in the North, Clay predicted that President Millard Fillmore, the New York
Whig and executive of just six months following the sudden death of Zachary Taylor,
would employ military might if necessary to execute the Fugitive Slave Law. Naturally,
Clay appealed to Unionist sentiment, asserting that he and the men of his audience,
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should “never—never—never” consent to disunion.14 “I can conceive no possible
contingency” for dissolving the Union, exclaimed Clay before the packed legislature.15
Clay also denounced those he labeled as agitators within his own party, proclaiming that
he would “cease to be a Whig” rather than embrace an organization that advocated
abolition. Clay even complimented Kentucky Democrats, a group containing many
longtime foes, thanking them for their cooperation in the efforts to pass the Compromise
of 1850. In closing, Clay pointed out Kentucky’s vital place in holding the nation
together and urged the state’s legislators to continue the fight against the voices of
division.16
The upper ranks of Kentucky’s Whig Party heartily rejoiced. Many had fought
vigorously for Clay during his presidential runs and trumpeted the victory of their
beloved party leader’s compromise. Though the staunchest Clay supporters still felt stung
by his electoral loss in 1844, the victory of fellow Kentucky Whig Zachary Taylor just
four years later afforded them some comfort. The solace among Kentucky Whigs proved
short-lived, however, when Taylor’s death shocked the nation just a little over a year into
his term. Following Taylor’s death, his vice president, Millard Fillmore, assumed office.
Fillmore’s presidency also proved brief, however, and reasons for celebration among
Whigs soon dissipated after 1850. A fractured party enabled the Democratic Party to sail
to a commanding victory in 1852. Already weakened and exhausted by age and decades
of political involvement, Clay died the same year of tuberculosis.
Clay’s beloved Whig Party, a major contender on the national stage for nearly two
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decades, faded faster than party leaders anticipated. In Kentucky, a Whig stronghold
throughout the party’s lifespan, the party’s decline proved complicated. Though
temporarily brushed aside during the sectional calamity of 1850, a number of issues, most
notably, immigration, naturalization, and temperance, had steadily brewed beneath the
surface since the mid-1840s and fueled political debates. The Whig and Democratic
Parties’ unwillingness to confront these issues aggressively fired a strong anti-party
sentiment throughout the nation. Voter discontent, combined with the decline of the Whig
Party, fueled the ascendance of a new and tightly focused political organization, the
Know Nothing Party.17 Also known as the American Party, the Know Nothings of the
1850s formed a political coalition known for its unapologetic nativism. During its short
heyday in Kentucky politics, the party enjoyed significant success at the ballot box, but
its rise had been in the making for over a decade.
***
Understanding the Know Nothing Party insurgency in Kentucky requires examining the
great popularity of the state’s Whig Party, beginning with its dominance in the 1830s.
Nationally, the Whigs presented themselves (in varying degrees) as the party of internal
improvements, a national bank, public education, and a federalized government. The
Whig philosophy espoused a centralized social policy as well. The American people,
Henry Clay proclaimed, “were entitled to the protecting care of a paternal government.”18
On the other end of the political spectrum, the Democratic Party remained suspicious of a
strong central government and advocated greater power at the state and local levels. For
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both economic and cultural reasons, Democrats stressed individual responsibility to shape
outcomes free from government regulation.19
Demographically, Whigs tended to run well among all social classes within cities
and trading centers, but the party proved particularly attractive to the economic and social
elites of urban communities.20 During the party’s two-decade history, Whigs remained
predominantly associated with Yankee Protestants and British-American immigrants. In
contrast, their Democratic rivals fared better among people of Dutch and German descent
and Catholics especially.21 Though the religious makeup of the parties in Kentucky
generally replicated national patterns, regional economic interests often superseded class
or ethnic identity in shaping party affiliation. In the central, hemp-producing,
commercially oriented Bluegrass region, the Whig Party reigned supreme. In this area,
slaveholders traditionally voted Whig and non-slaveholders Democratic. In peripheral
areas of the state, the opposite dynamic prevailed. Throughout the poor farming
communities along the Ohio River to the north, mountainous communities to the east, the
Jackson Purchase region in the extreme west, and less developed counties along the
southern border to Tennessee, wealthy slaveholders voted Democratic, while Whigs drew
their support from voters who registered lower on the socioeconomic scale.22 From the
1830s to the late 1840s, this complex coalition enabled Whigs to dominate Kentucky
politics. In the gubernatorial elections of 1836 and 1840, Kentucky Whigs maintained the
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governor’s seat and carried the state in the presidential contests as well. Furthermore,
Whigs held approximately three-fifths of the seats in the state House of Representatives,
two-thirds of the state senate, and both United States Senate seats.23 Between 1839 and
1841, the Whig Party provided as many as eleven of the state’s thirteen congressmen.24
Whigs maintained this control of Kentucky politics in the 1830s and 1840s for
several key reasons. As the state’s most famous politician on the national stage, Henry
Clay attracted numerous voters to the party. Arguably the most influential Whig in the
nation, Clay built the Whig Party around opposition to Andrew Jackson and defense of
Clay’s American System which espoused economic development through internal
improvements, high protective tariffs, and a national bank.25 Whig positions on economic
issues proved especially popular in much of Kentucky. Hemp farmers appreciated the
high protective tariffs that kept foreign-grown hemp from competing with their crop.
Ambitious farmers approved the party’s internal improvement proposals as a means to
bring more of the state within the reach of markets. Kentucky businessmen also
appreciated the advances spurred by internal improvements that enabled them to move
products at greater speed.26 Dependent on waterway connections to the Mississippi River
and New Orleans for trade, most antebellum Kentuckians favored the federal
government’s sponsorship of improvements on the western rivers.27 Spurred by the
internal improvements championed by Whig legislators, Kentucky undertook a number
of ambitious projects in the antebellum era to make the state’s many rivers more
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navigable. The Whig internal improvement program encouraged the construction of
turnpike roads, connecting locations not positioned on major waterways. As a result of
these economic endeavors, a clear majority of Kentucky’s voters gravitated toward the
Whig Party in the 1830s and 1840s.
These years also witnessed a stampede of non-elite white males into the political
arena, sparking high and enthusiastic voter turnout in state and national politics.
Nationally, 77 percent of the electorate voted in presidential elections between 1840 and
1860, compared with an average of just under 50 percent between 1824 and 1836.28 The
heated political campaigns of this period further illustrated the importance of politics in
Kentucky. During the 1840s and 1850s, local elections generally took place each year,
most often in January or April. State elections came on the first Monday in August.29 In
August of odd-numbered years, Kentuckians elected congressmen, placing the election
approximately four months before the regular session of Congress that opened in
December. Presidential contests provided the only November elections, when
Kentuckians voted for a slate of electors rather than the candidates themselves.30
Among the many political contests of antebellum Kentucky, few impacted future
debates more than the 1844 presidential election. After two tries, Kentucky’s Henry Clay
secured the Whig nomination for the presidency and Whig leaders remained confident of
his chances for victory. The heated contest that ensued pitted supporters of Clay against
backers of his Democratic challenger, the former governor of Tennessee, James K. Polk.
The issues championed during the 1844 campaign held lingering consequences in the
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decades that followed and introduced figures who influenced the state’s political
atmosphere for years.
A predecessor of the Know Nothing Party, the Native American movement,
injected the issue of nativism into the political debates of 1844. Speaking passionately
against the deluge of “paupers” and “criminals of the Old World” arriving on America’s
shores, Native American supporters sought an immediate reduction in both immigration
and naturalization.31 Although certain nativist tendencies long existed within Whig ranks,
the party’s leadership in Kentucky largely repudiated Native American claims. In
Louisville, powerful Whig newspapers made a concerted effort to distance themselves
from the rhetoric of the Native American movement throughout the 1844 campaign. With
the city home to more than 4,500 German residents, noted at the time for their “quiet,
unobtrusive, and inoffensive manners,” Whig leaders in Louisville worked to gain a
footing among their community.32 Though most new immigrants provided a reliable
contingent of the Democratic Party, Whigs in 1844 actively sought support among the
growing German and Irish populations. As the contest for the White House gathered
steam, a number of Whig leaders and party newspapers made a conscious effort to gain
ground among naturalized voters.
The most reliably Whig organ in Kentucky, the Louisville Journal, also refuted
nativist claims during the election. Editor George Dennison Prentice, a native of
Connecticut and graduate of Brown University, stood at the Journal’s helm. Invited by
Kentucky Whigs to write a biography of Henry Clay in 1830, Prentice accepted an offer
31
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to cofound the Journal the same year.33 The heightened nativist and anti-Catholic
language that characterized his later work did not appear in 1844. In fact, under
Prentice’s direction, the Louisville Journal ran an extra weekly edition addressing the
concerns of naturalized citizens in Kentucky and urged them to join the Whig Party:
If it is not known to you it should be . . . that all men naturalized according to the
existing laws are beyond the power of any tribunal in the country and cannot be
disenfranchised. Their right of citizenship is a vested right. . . . The law which
would disenfranchise them would be an ex post facto law.
Such of the foreigners as are lovers of law and order, and the Germans are
peculiarly so, will find their natural affinities with the Whigs. . . . The Whig Party,
in every quarter, has repudiated all connection or sympathy with the Native
Americans. According to the genious [sic] of our institutions the right of suffrage
should be extended to foreigners on liberal terms.34
Louisville’s German newspaper, the Beobachter am Ohio, however, resisted the Whig
advances.35 Prentice tried to assuage Germans’ fears in the Journal’s pages, writing on
August 7, 1844:
We can assure the Germans in general, that the Whigs of Louisville are their
friends and not their enemies. They need not fear any ill-judged and incendiary
publication in a newspaper can influence or exasperate the Whig party against
them. Though vile demagogues, for base and selfish purposes, have attempted to
poison their minds by misrepresentations . . . they will continue to be cherished as
a valuable portion of the community.36

Nativism and Whig Moral Reform
Contrary to Prentice’s proclamations, strains of nativism had existed within Whig
political thought since the party’s formation. Profoundly influenced by the Second Great
Awakening, which began in the 1790s and picked up steam after the 1820s, evangelical
33
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Protestant Whigs sought to transform American society along moral lines. Reformminded religious crusaders sought to do more than win individual souls to Christ. Rather,
they believed all of American society must respond to His call.37 These Protestant
reformers viewed immigration, alcohol use, and slavery as the crucial moral threats to the
nation. As a result, the Whig Party more often sought intervention while their Democratic
opponents preferred complacency.38 Just as Whigs preferred an active state that promoted
economic improvement, evangelical party members believed in government activity that
promoted Protestant ideals of moral improvement.
Emphasizing “morality” and “duties” rather than “rights,” Whig reformers
pursued collective as well as individual moral change.39 Whigs expected the community,
like its members, to set an example of virtue and enforce it whenever possible.40 Stressing
the importance of communal unity, Whigs sought to suppress social and class conflict. As
a result, many party members assumed active roles in the antebellum immigration and
temperance debates. In response to the flood of boisterous new foreign arrivals in the
United States, conservative Whigs sought social order by halting immigration or
promoting immediate assimilation. Whig Daniel Webster reflected such concerns,
stating: “All we desire, whoever come, is that they will Americanize themselves; that
forgetting the things that are behind, they will look forward [and] . . . prove themselves
worthy and respectable citizens.”41 Sharing Webster’s concerns, evangelical reformers
assumed moral responsibility over others, especially new arrivals. As a growing number
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of Catholic immigrants, many of whom contradicted evangelical Protestant attitudes
toward liquor, entered the country, Whig reformers linked the issues of temperance and
immigration. Reform-minded Whigs promoted laws regulating or prohibiting alcohol as a
method to promote a moral and virtuous society.42 Over the course of the 1840s,
arguments against immigration and drunkenness became increasingly intertwined.
During the 1844 campaign, a number of Whigs attempted to turn rising nativist
sentiments to Clay’s advantage. Particularly in the Northeast, Whigs planted stories
assuring Native American supporters that Clay wanted to tighten both immigration and
naturalization laws.43 Such efforts, however, varied with region. As a result, campaigning
Whigs heralded themselves as either friend to the immigrant or nativist sympathizer. Mob
violence pitting nativists against immigrants also vaulted onto the national scene in May
1844. Shots fired from an Irish firehouse at a Native American Party rally in Philadelphia
sparked mob violence that lasted three days and resulted in fourteen deaths. The 1844
Philadelphia riots were the most deadly of any non-election political mob in antebellum
America.44 A second Philadelphia riot took place two months later, leaving at least six
more dead.45 The season of Catholic-Protestant riots in Philadelphia heightened nativist
resentment and produced an American Republican Party in New York and Pennsylvania
that demanded stricter naturalization laws. Whigs in these states sided with the nativists
and decried the harmful influence of immigrants in the political arena. In 1844, American
Republicans managed to win municipal elections in both New York City and
42
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Philadelphia. Their charged language, combined with the spectacle of the Philadelphia
riots, outraged Catholic voters and further cemented their attachment to the Democratic
Party.46 The violence and nativist rhetoric in Philadelphia weakened national support for
Native Americans as the 1844 Election Day approached.47
Both Whigs and Democrats flooded Clay’s office with requests for his opinion on
the mounting debate over naturalization. Wishing to focus on the old Whig agenda of
internal improvements and the American System, Clay resented attempts to introduce
new and especially volatile issues, particularly volatile ones, into the presidential contest.
On the immigration issue in particular, Clay hesitated to upset either faction. “How am I
to comply with the wishes of both parties?” Clay pondered.48 “What right have my
opponents to attribute to me a wish to alter the immigration laws?” Trying to appease
both sides, Clay stated only his intention to make a distinction between those already
naturalized, those awaiting naturalization, and those who might arrive in the future
following the passage of a new naturalization law. Fearing to offend potential nativist
Whig voters, however, Clay conceded that perhaps some “additional restrictions,” such as
the extension of the probationary period, could improve the naturalization process.49 Clay
hoped to appeal to ethnic voters in Louisville and elsewhere by finessing the immigration
issue, but his strategy only alienated nativists from the Whig Party.
Responding to the failure of both parties to embrace changes in the naturalization
laws, American Republicans printed and distributed a manifesto of their nativist
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sentiments in Kentucky and throughout the nation. The American Republican Manifesto
decried the dangers of the “foreign influence,” likening their arrival in the United States
to a “Grecian horse.”50 American Republicans further asserted the “inalienable right of
Americans, to do their own fighting, their own voting, and their own working.”
Naturalized citizens, they proclaimed, could not possess a “true and abiding” attachment
to the United States, for while the country was but “a step-mother to them. . . . She is our
nursing parent.”51 The manifesto concluded by warning voters that “the hour of danger is
approaching,” denounced “the most gross and outrageous frauds . . . committed under our
present Naturalization system,” and urged citizens to “resist this tide of foreign influence
that is sweeping everything American from the face of our land.”52 As the 1844 campaign
continued, however, neither of the major parties addressed American Republican
concerns. While the Democrats welcomed throngs of naturalized citizens into their ranks,
many Whigs held onto the hope that they too could attract new voters.
Certainly, a number of Whigs wanted to include nativist proposals in the party
platform, but Clay continued to refuse because he feared the defection of Catholic voters.
In an effort to secure as many Catholics in the Whig camp as possible, Clay wrote to
Maryland Congressman John Pendleton Kennedy, inquiring if his state’s Democrats were
engaged in efforts “to unite the Catholics against us? And if so, with what success?”53
Writing to New York Governor William H. Seward, Clay implored his fellow Whig
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leader to meet Archbishop John Hughes and assure him of Clay’s goodwill.54
The selection of Clay’s running mate, however, failed to convince Catholics of
Whig sincerity. In Baltimore, the Whig Convention chose Theodore Frelinghuysen, a
former New Jersey senator and leader of numerous Protestant reform groups, catching
even Clay by surprise. Despite Clay’s shock, Frelinghuysen’s nomination played directly
into the hopes and concerns of northern reform-minded Whigs. Frelinghuysen’s
association with the American Bible Society, which promulgated the idea that American
Catholics should convert to Protestantism, caused particular doubt among Catholic voters
who might otherwise have voted for Clay. Martin John Spalding, the future archbishop of
Baltimore and a Kentuckian by birth, respected Clay but voiced distrust of Frelinghuysen.
Although he planned to vote for Clay, Spalding declared he would never cast a ballot for
Frelinghuysen as vice president. Informed that he could not vote for one without
supporting the other, Spalding replied, “Then I shall not vote for Mr. Clay.”55 As the
results of the election revealed, most Catholic voters echoed Spalding’s decision.56
The 1844 election was the last presidential contest in which Election Day took
place on different days in different states. For the first twelve days of November, the
outcome of the election hung in the balance while each state voted. When the final results
arrived, Polk and the Democrats rejoiced. Despite the intense efforts of the Whig Party,
Clay’s bid for the presidency proved unsuccessful. The 1844 election revealed, however,
a near evenly split electorate, with Polk’s percentage of the popular vote standing a mere
1.4 percent over Clay’s. Of the nearly 2,700,000 ballots cast, only 38,181 separated the
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two men.57 To the ire of Whigs, the abolitionist James G. Birney of the northern Liberty
Party garnered 62,000 votes or 2.3 percent of the total, costing Clay the battleground
states of New York and Michigan.58 Had Clay secured Birney’s votes, he would have
won New York and with it, the presidency.
News of massive Democratic electoral fraud further enraged Clay’s supporters.
According to Whig sources, large numbers of ineligible immigrants tipped the scales in
favor of the Democrats.59 In Philadelphia, the city quaked by riots, immigrants solidly
voted for the Democratic Party, edging Pennsylvania into Polk’s column. Led by
Democratic claims to favor tariff protection, even many Protestant workingmen in
Philadelphia cast their votes for Polk.60 The Whig Party’s attempt to court both
immigrants and nativists had failed. In surveying Clay’s close defeat, longtime Whig
John Quincy Adams blamed nativists and Catholics alike for the Whig Party’s loss. “The
partial associations of Native Americans, Irish Catholics, abolition societies, liberty party,
the Pope of Rome, the Democracy of the sword,” were to blame for the Democratic
victory, Adams opined, and “are sealing the fate of this nation, which nothing less than
the interposition of Omnipotence can save.”61
Disgust at voting frauds among immigrants led a number of Whigs to espouse
nativist principles. Louisville’s second most influential Whig organ, the Courier, wasted
no time in announcing its conversion to American Republican ideas.62 The Courier’s
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editor Walter N. Haldeman, formerly a clerk in the Journal office, became Louisville’s
first editor to espouse the cause of nativism.63 Fervently denouncing the alleged electoral
fraud, Haldeman urged legislators to create laws preventing future mishaps. Haldeman
also framed the annexation of Texas, which Clay opposed and Polk supported, in nativist
terms, asserting that Democrats swayed naturalized voters by promising that they would
also benefit from Texas land.64 The results of the 1844 election deeply influenced
Haldeman and on July 4, 1845 he represented Kentucky at the first national convention of
the Native American Party.65 After serving as vice president of the party’s Philadelphia
convention, the young editor returned to Kentucky charged with renewed enthusiasm for
the nativist cause.66 In response to the Democratic victory in 1844, a growing number of
Whigs like Haldeman contended that the party needed to establish its own anti-foreign
and anti-Catholic credentials.67 Kentucky Whig Governor William Owsley likewise
blamed immigrant voting for Clay’s loss and implored the state’s legislature in January
1845 to pass voter registration laws to combat voter fraud.68 The governor of Maryland
requested a similar law.69 Other Whig leaders, however, hesitated to champion the
nativist cause.
Following defeat, Clay himself admitted that allowing the foreign-born to vote so
quickly after their arrival in the United States produced “some evil,” although he believed
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such problems “local and limited.”70 Whig supporter Ambrose Spencer further prodded
Clay on the immigration issue. “The naturalization laws must be altered,” wrote Spencer,
“and the door forever shut on the admission of foreigners to citizenship, or that they
undergo a long probation—I am for the former.”71 According to Spencer, the German and
Irish immigrants could “never understandingly exercise the franchise . . . because of their
ignorance [they] are naturally inclined to go with the loafers of our own population.”72
Clay, however, attributed more blame to American Republicans and Liberty Party voters
than to the recently naturalized, noting that “Whigs have always suffered from parties
having but one objective.”73 Although Clay’s 1844 defeat spurred a number of vocal
Kentuckians to join the Native American movement, nativism alone failed to extinguish
the Whig Party within the state.
Manifest Destiny and Whig Decline
As the 1840s continued, national politics moved farther away from traditional
Whig issues. The rise of Manifest Destiny and Polk’s efforts to add Oregon and Texas to
the Union pushed the issue of territorial expansion to the forefront of American politics.
During his presidential bid, Clay had argued against the annexation of Texas, warning
that it would cause war with Mexico. Within a short time, Clay’s prediction proved
correct as the Polk administration soon provoked war.74 But the idea of territorial
expansion proved popular in Kentucky. In the months before the Mexican conflict, most
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Americans viewed the war with an urgent sense of nationalism.75 Within Kentucky, a
solemn sense of state and local pride fueled the call to arms. On the eve of war,
Kentuckians enjoyed large, boisterous parades filled with patriotic sermons and music.76
Like Americans across the nation, white Kentuckians linked nationalism with church and
family, forging a deeply personal sense of American identity.77 Manifest Destiny, the
belief that the United States was destined to stretch from Atlantic to Pacific, drew from
this mid-nineteenth century American nationalism. Before allowing their sons to leave for
the Mexican War, old men presented their sons with ornate swords and pistols, and
admonished them to defend the martial honor of “Old Kentuck.”78 “True, faithful, and
brave,” one Covington editor described the volunteers in May 1846, “our . . . countrymen
constitute a never-failing bulwark of strength upon which the nation may always rely.
Well may we be proud of the name of Kentuckian.”79
The Mexican War’s broad acceptance in the state placed Kentucky Whigs on the
defensive and divided the party. The Louisville Courier, a reliable Whig mouthpiece,
cheered the conflict and denounced Kentucky Whig congressmen who voted against the
declaration of war.80 In contrast, Prentice of the Louisville Journal expressed strong antiwar sentiments. In an editorial, Prentice predicted that the American people would
without a doubt repudiate this “unjust and aggressive . . . war against God.”81 Most state
residents disagreed, however, and more Kentuckians offered to join the war effort than
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the U.S. Army could use. The Mexican War, the Whig opposition to annexation, and the
ensuing debate further weakened the cohesion of the party in Kentucky and nationally.
Several additional issues contributed to the downfall of Kentucky’s Whig Party.
By the end of the 1840s, economic issues and Clay’s American System proposals proved
less attractive among Kentucky voters. As the effects of the Panic of 1837 diminished,
prosperous economic times helped extinguish arguments over further government
economic intervention.82 By the mid-nineteenth century, Whigs had also successfully
won the contest over banks in Kentucky. Even many Democrats supported the state banks
that Kentucky Whigs championed in previous decades.83 Internal waterway
improvements, in contrast, began to generate opposition. With the swift rise of railroads,
the need for river improvements in Kentucky became less important. As a result,
numerous men in both the Whig and Democratic Parties favored state aid to railroads as
the most effective way to develop Kentucky’s economy, supplanting Whigs’ previous
commitment to waterway improvements.84 As both parties generally supported aide to
railroads, Democrats effectively undercut traditional Whig appeal.
Kentucky Whig leaders also assessed the damage after their leader’s national loss,
with many questioning the relevance of old Whig principles. They noted in particular the
inability of the party to capitalize nationally on the economic concerns that proved
successful four years prior. At the state level, many believed Whig success over the past
decade rendered economic issues less relevant.85 By 1844, river improvements and state
banks stood throughout much of Kentucky. As the economic issues became less relevant,
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concerns over immigration and naturalization, though always a part of Whig appeal for
some voters, increasingly rose to the fore.86
The bitter contest between two of Kentucky’s leading Whigs, Clay and General
Zachary Taylor for the party’s presidential nomination in 1848 further spurred division
within the party. When Whigs selected Taylor, Clay and his avid supporters expressed
complete dismay. Members of the Native American Party, whom Clay partially blamed
for his defeat four years earlier, offered Clay a spot as their candidate following the
announcement of Taylor’s selection, but he declined.87 Taylor won the presidency, but
the battle for the nomination left lasting wounds. Clay’s supporters, aghast at the party’s
snub of their candidate, claimed that he would have won with ease against Democrat
Lewis Cass. They also charged that Taylor ran far less on principle than personality. The
continuing intraparty animosity between supporters of Clay and Taylor created
permanent schisms within Kentucky’s Whig establishment. And because Taylor’s
supporters deemphasized traditional Whig concerns, appeals to party loyalty proved less
powerful in the future. As a result of the party’s growing incoherence, Kentucky Whigs
failed to manage successfully the cultural issues of the late 1840s, slavery, temperance,
and nativism.88 By the end of 1849, even Clay believed the party was “dissolving,”
despite Taylor’s electoral victory, while support for the Democratic Party grew.89
Slavery and Whig Decline
Though Clay’s Senate seat and Taylor’s presidency provided an apparent opportunity for
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Whigs, the issue of slavery continued to undermine the party’s cohesion. With territorial
expansion came the question of slavery’s role in the West. Would slavery spread too,
along with America’s land holdings? The question ignited a firestorm and pitted northern
Whigs who opposed slavery’s expansion against their southern brethren who supported it.
Members of the Thirty-First Congress, which met in December 1849, faced a growing
sectional crisis spurred by the acquisition of western land as a result of the Mexican War.
After the discovery of gold in California, legions of Americans flocked to the Far West in
hopes of staking their claims. In response to the western boom, Congress accelerated the
admission of California as a state. But the issue of slavery muddled California’s bid for
statehood and divided Congress along sectional lines. Californians voted overwhelmingly
to exclude slavery in their state constitution. Southerners in Congress responded by
vowing to block California’s admission as a free state unless northerners reciprocated
with certain concessions.90
Kentucky Whigs sent Clay back to the Senate in 1848. In 1850, he crafted a
compromise championed by Illinois Democrat Stephen Douglas and aimed at appeasing
the North and South. The deal called on Texas to surrender its claim to New Mexico
Territory, which along with Utah Territory would decide whether to allow slavery under
the principle of popular sovereignty. The deal also included a more stringent Fugitive
Slave Law that operated throughout the United States. To appease northern lawmakers,
the compromise allowed California to enter the Union as a free state. Congress also
banned the slave trade, though not slavery altogether, within the District of Columbia.
The controversial nature of each measure required Douglas to push the compromise
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through Congress piece by piece rather than as a whole.91 Patriotic and unionist sentiment
temporarily healed Whig divisions as Clay rose again on the national stage, and even
leading Kentucky Democrats praised Clay’s efforts. Heralding Clay’s compromise effort,
Kentucky Whig newspapers urged unionism. The “Union Must Be Preserved!” urged the
Louisville Journal on January 3, 1850. Insisting that the Union proved “indispensably
necessary” to the security of slave property, Prentice argued passionately against
disunion.92 While Kentucky Whigs and numerous Democrats supported the ailing Clay
and the compromise, the effects of the agreement proved ephemeral.
Although the compromise averted a sectional crisis in 1850, many northerners and
southerners believed their region sacrificed too much in the process. Discontent was
especially pronounced in the North, where the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 exposed
northerners to the barbarity of slavery and proved deeply unpopular. The law placed the
burden of proof on captured blacks and gave them little ability to prove their freedom.93
Instead, a claimant could bring an alleged fugitive before a federal commissioner (a new
office created by the law) to prove ownership by an affidavit from a slave-state court or
by the testimony of white witnesses. If the commissioner decided against the claimant he
received a fee of five dollars and if in favor ten dollars.94 This provision, supposedly
justified by the paperwork necessary to remand a fugitive to the South, became notorious
among abolitionists as a bribe to commissioners. The 1850 law additionally required U.S.
marshals and deputies to help slaveowners capture their property and fined them $1,000
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if they refused.95 It empowered marshals to deputize citizens on the spot to aid in seizing
a fugitive, and imposed stiff criminal penalties on anyone who harbored a fugitive or
obstructed his capture. The federal treasury bore the expenses of capturing and returning
slaves. The operation of the law confirmed northerners’ belief that it was rigged in favor
of claimants. Within the first fifteen months following its passage, federal commissioners
returned eighty-four fugitives to slavery and released only five.96 Over the course of the
1850s, commissioners returned 332 and declared free only eleven. Nor did the law
include a statute of limitations; some of the first fugitives returned to slavery were
longtime residents of the North.97 Countless northerners witnessed the sight of black men
and women forcibly returned to bondage and denied trial by jury.98 Northerners from
both parties opposed parts of the compromise, but it especially damaged the Whigs,
because while most southern Whigs approved of the Fugitive Slave Law, nearly all
northern Whigs opposed it.99
As the political fracturing of the 1850s continued, Democrats made inroads in
previous Whig strongholds, including Kentucky. “It is a known fact that the Democrats
are organizing throughout the state,” read a Kentucky Whig circular of June 24, 1851,
“and a proper organization of the Whigs in each county is all important to counteract
their efforts.”100 The announcement urged Whigs to show the letter to “our political
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friends,” asking for their support and cooperation against the Democrats.101 A second
party circular of September 10, 1851 advised groups of three or more “discreet and
active” Whig Party members to form vigilance committees in each voting district to
create alphabetical lists of voters classified as Whigs, Democrats, or Doubtful. For each
“doubtful” voter, the circular advised, the committee should assign a person “known to
have influence with him, for the purpose of supplying him with documents, and by the
use and lawful means to confirm him in the true Whig faith.”102 The circular also advised
the Whig “to whom such a voter is assigned” to look for additional “doubtful” voters at
the polls.103 Despite these localized efforts, Kentucky’s Whig Party suffered defeat in the
1851 gubernatorial contest, though Whigs retained control of both houses of the
Kentucky legislature and controlled half of the congressional delegation.104 But Whig
numbers decreased the following year with Democrats gaining seats in both chambers of
Kentucky’s legislature.105
Even before the Whigs’ 1852 presidential convention, Charles Francis Adams
predicted a defeat of the Whig nominee because northern and southern factions of the
party “prefer the success of the enemy to that of the other portion.”106 While most
northern delegates supported Winfield Scott’s nomination on a platform that denounced
the Fugitive Slave Law, southern delegates sought to re-nominate Millard Fillmore and
affirm the finality of Clay’s compromise.107 Neither northern nor southern delegates fully
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achieved their goal. Winfield Scott defeated Fillmore for the Whig nomination in 1852,
but in hopes of retaining southern support, Scott ran on a platform that endorsed the 1850
Compromise. Scott’s efforts to appease northern and southern interests would prove
unsuccessful in both regions on Election Day.
Nativism and Whig Decline
The ever increasing number of immigrants reaching American shores also divided Whigs.
From 1845 to 1854, some 2,900,000 immigrants arrived in the United States, more than
had arrived in the previous seven decades combined. By 1852, the nativist surge had
dwarfed the American Republican and Native American movements of the previous two
election cycles. Growing nativist sentiments made the presidential contest between
Kentucky Whigs and the Democrats highly volatile.
In Louisville, the immigrant population reached 18,000 in 1852, growing by close
to a third in just two years.108 Reflecting the fractured nature of the party, a number of
Whig papers, including the Louisville Journal, continued their attempts to win the votes
of the growing immigrant population. The Louisville Journal, for example, appealed to
the state’s Catholic population by noting that Scott’s daughters had been educated in a
“Nunnery.”109 Such liberality toward the Catholic Church, Prentice exclaimed, did not
exist among the leaders in the Democratic Party.110 Although a devout Episcopalian,
Scott had sent his daughters to a Catholic school, a fact that alienated nativists from the
Whig Party. Scott traveled to Kentucky during the 1852 campaign, using the trip to deny
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Whig hostility toward naturalized citizens.111 In Lexington, Scott’s party visited Ashland
to honor Clay’s memory. He then ventured to Frankfort, where he rebuked a recent antiimmigrant address delivered by Kentuckian James Harlan, an influential nativist and
father of Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan. “For this reception,” Scott
affirmed, “I thank you all, my countrymen. And by this term, permit me to say I include
all classes—Democrats and Whigs—native-born and adopted citizens.”112
To further their appeal among Catholic voters, the Whigs contrasted Scott’s
friendly attitude toward Catholics with the fact that his Democratic opponent, Franklin
Pierce, came from New Hampshire, a state that still denied Catholics full civil rights. In
speeches and editorials, Whigs regularly noted that Pierce’s New Hampshire stood alone
among states that still made office holding contingent on Protestantism.113 Pierce and the
Democrats, argued the Louisville Journal, embraced the “odious and infamous religious
test” of New Hampshire’s constitution.114 In response, Democratic leaders maintained
that Kentucky Catholics could not believe Scott’s appeals and warned that “a short time
since, ere Native Americanism had culminated in its short career, General Scott was
identified as a member of that faction, and loudly claimed as a disciple.”115 As Democrats
charged, Scott and the Whigs harbored nativist sentiments and masked their beliefs in an
effort to win the election.116 The Democratic embrace of naturalized citizens and Whig
attempts to court foreign-born Catholic voters outraged nativist voters and fueled a
growing anti-party sentiment. Nationwide, many nativist voters, who previously had
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supported the Whigs, stayed home rather than cast their ballot for Scott.117
Despite the heated rhetoric of the campaign, the election passed in Kentucky on
November 2, 1852 without violence. Though ultimately victorious in Kentucky, Whigs
proved far weaker than they had in previous elections, carrying the state by little more
than 3,500 votes of the more than 100,000 cast.118 Still, the Whig victory in Kentucky
came as a surprise to their opponents. Confident Democrats believed their own rhetoric of
Whig division and overestimated Whig disaffection with Scott. Disappointed part
members failed to take the defeat magnanimously, including the Democratic Louisville
Times:
We believed that she [Kentucky] had sufficiently disenthralled herself from the
shackles and collar of party to defy the sinister force of discipline, on an occasion
when her interests and the clear suggestions of patriotic duty so strongly, as in the
late contest, invoked her to cast off her allegiance to the Whig Party and take her
stand in the ranks of Democracy.119
Whigs likewise responded to their victory with little grace, with the Journal’s Prentice
proclaiming that Democrats had formed “one of the most unholy coalitions” during the
year’s campaign, uniting partisan toughs, extreme proslavery agitators, and those who
sided with sectional interests over the Union.120
Nationally, however, the results of the 1852 election disappointed Whigs. While
Scott carried Kentucky, he lost the national contest, carrying only three additional states:
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Tennessee (the last by a razor thin margin).121 Other races
also proved disastrous for the national Whig Party. Of the twelve governorships at stake,
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the Whigs lost nine. In the House elections, Whig candidates won less than a third of all
contested races, representing a net loss of seventeen seats and giving the Democrats
control of the lower chamber.122 However, the results of the 1852 election did not signify
a stampede of former Whigs into the Democratic camp. Rather, Whig losses owed more
to abstention than party-switching.123 Many nativist Whig voters believed the party no
longer represented their interests, and stayed home rather than vote for Scott. The
election’s results revealed that anti-party sentiment damaged the Whigs far more than
their Democratic opponents.
Although Scott carried Kentucky by a narrow margin, Whigs still failed to
respond effectively to mounting concerns about nativism and temperance.124 As one
Cincinnati newspaper noted, neither Democrats nor Whigs knew how to approach the
temperance debate as “the people are not divided [on temperance] according to their old
political affinities.”125 Ethno-cultural and geographic factors more than party affiliation
determined one’s stance on the issue. While city dwellers and immigrants tended to
oppose prohibition, evangelical Protestants and inhabitants of rural areas typically
supported government-imposed temperance.126 Both the Whig and Democratic leadership
failed to take a strong stand on the issue, contributing to voters’ growing disillusionment
with both parties and their leaders. Anti-party sentiment increased as voters complained
of the “old fogies” and “wire-pullers” who cared only about keeping their positions of
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power.127
These anti-party attitudes, along with nativism and anti-Catholicism, helped fuel
the growth of Know Nothingism in Kentucky, and throughout the nation. The origins of
Know Nothingism strongly resembled other anti-party movements of the previous seven
years. In its mounting strength, however, the Know Nothing movement of the mid-1850s
greatly surpassed previous anti-party stirrings, ultimately succeeding in toppling
Kentucky’s Whig Party and replacing it as the majority party in the state. 128 In the early
1850s, the Democrats and Whigs’ similar positions on the issues of immigration,
naturalization, and temperance convinced many Kentucky voters to reject the old party
structures. Despite the accusations of both sides, the state’s political parties reached a
stalemate in 1853.129 Possibly because of the parties’ similarities, voter turnouts in 1852
and 1853 remained substantially below previous levels, with only 70 percent of potential
voters casting ballots compared to the 87 percent turnout in the 1848 gubernatorial
election.130
Throughout 1853 and 1854, party leaders in Kentucky searched for new issues to
galvanize old party loyalties, but the parity of the two parties rendered the introduction of
any new issue hazardous. A false step by either Kentucky Whigs or Democrats might
allow the other to gain political capital.131 Consequently, party leaders espoused safe
issues that fit neatly into the framework of the old debates of the Jackson and Clay era
but failed to ignite voters. The lingering timidity of party leaders served only to alienate
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further members of the electorate who viewed the parties as dodging the key issues of
immigration and temperance. In response, anti-party sentiment, a chief motivator of the
Know Nothing cause, flourished.132
Local events also undermined Whig cohesion in Kentucky. In the spring and
summer of 1854, Louisville and Kentucky newspapers focused their attention on the
sensational Matthew Ward murder trial. Whig leader John J. Crittenden defended Ward,
the son of a wealthy Louisvillian who was accused of murdering his teacher. The
Democratic press charged that the case represented a prime example of elites defending
their own. Ward’s eventual acquittal ignited a firestorm. Following the verdict, protests
erupted throughout Louisville, assailing Crittenden and the Whigs who defended him.
While the Democratic press rebuked Crittenden and cheered the mob protests, Whigs
generally defended Crittenden’s course and reprimanded demonstrators. For weeks, the
Louisville papers discussed the Ward trial and the ensuing protests in lead articles.133
Many Kentuckians took a clear message from the Ward acquittal: both justice and Whig
leaders could be bought in Kentucky. The Ward trial and its aftermath further tarnished
the image of Whigs in the state, especially among working class voters, many of whom
gravitated into the Know Nothing movement.
By 1854, all of the prerequisites for an outburst of American nativism had fallen
into place. Many nativist sympathizers concluded that the sheer number of newcomers,
their religious affiliation, and their perceived lack of skills made swift assimilation
impossible.134 Additionally, an existing cadre of die-hard nativists, formerly associated
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with the Native American and American Republican movements, waited to foment such
sentiments. The Whig Party, meanwhile, offered no resistance. Though weakened
nationally by the explosive dispute over slavery’s western expansion, the unaddressed
issues of immigration and naturalization dimmed the Whig Party’s future in Kentucky.
Finally, growing anti-party sentiment, fueled by the existing parties’ failure to respond
effectively to the issue of immigration and temperance, offered nativists the opportunity
to attract disillusioned voters.135 The political chaos, flamed by a resurgence of religious
controversies in 1853 and 1854, paved the way for a nativist upsurge. The crisis of
confidence that rocked the Whigs enabled an overtly nativist political organization, the
Know Nothing Party, to gain a mass following.136
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CHAPTER II
THE RISING TIDE: IMMIGRATION, ANTI-CATHOLICISM, AND THE
POLITICS OF KENTUCKY KNOW NOTHINGS
In the 1850s, Thomas R. Whitney, co-founder of the Order of United Americans and a
leading voice of American nativism, observed his crusade accumulate impressive
political support. Formed in 1844, Whitney’s order spread quickly from New York to
fifteen additional states within a decade.137 The purpose of the Order of United
Americans and similar nativist organizations remained clear. The duty of all good
American citizens, Whitney and his followers charged, was “to release our country from
the thralldom of foreign domination” and “protect civil and religious liberties against
growing alien influence.”138 By 1855, Whitney’s crusade proved so successful that he
joined a cadre of Know Nothing Party candidates elected to Congress.139
While often deemed a pejorative label, American Party members accepted and
utilized the “Know Nothing” name. Though the precise origin of “Know Nothing”
remains uncertain, the term apparently made its public debut in November 1853.140 In the
fall elections, the New York Tribune reported, the Whig candidate for state district
attorney lost “through the instrumentality of a mongrel ticket termed the ‘Know
Nothing.’ . . . This ticket,” continued the Tribune writer, “is the work of the managers of
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a secret organization growing out of the Order of United Americans.”141 A few days later,
the Tribune again mentioned “the Know Nothing organization,” calling it “but a new
dodge of protean nativism.”142 Neither reference mentioned the now universal belief that
the “Know Nothing” term derived from members’ practice of feigning ignorance when
interrogated about the organization. Nor does it appear that New York Tribune editor
Horace Greeley coined the famous term. Rather, the Tribune’s use of the label suggests
that instead of concocting the term, the newspaper simply reported what an outside
source relayed to it.143
Hardly shunning the Know Nothing brand, the members of the Order of United
Americans, the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, and other nativist organizations
embraced it. As the movement picked up steam, one of the first newspapers to voice
support named itself the Boston Know Nothing and the party established the Know
Nothing Almanac as its annual yearbook.144 Know Nothings’ correspondence reveals that
members used additional names to refer to the party. Numerous members referred to their
organization as “Sam” in letters and print. Drawing from a popular story, Know Nothings
attributed their origins to “Young Sam,” whose uncle (the famous “Uncle Sam”) had
become disheartened over America’s decline and asked his nephew to start an
organization to revitalize the nation.145 As the 1850s continued, the dissatisfied coalition
of nativist, unionist, and anti-party Americans heeded the call of “Young Sam” and
stampeded into the political process. Loyal Whig and Democratic newspapers in
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Kentucky and the nation responded with agitation and disbelief. Old Whigs and
Democratic editors pointed fingers at each other, charging that the Know Nothing
movement served merely as a trick engineered by the opposition and warned voters to
remain wary of the party’s rise.146 Although the upsurge of the Know Nothing Party in
Kentucky seemed instantaneous to most state politicians, the makings of an anti-foreign
and anti-Catholic movement had been brewing in Kentucky for more than a generation.
Catholic-Protestant Relations in Early Kentucky
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Kentucky Catholics in lived in relative
harmony alongside their Protestant neighbors.147 Indeed, a number of Maryland Catholics
of Irish descent stood among the first Kentucky settlers.148 Though colonial settlers
negatively associated Catholicism with imperial France and Spain, the image altered
somewhat in the first decades following American independence. During these years,
Catholics sided with their Protestant neighbors against common enemies, including
American Indians, the British, and rebellious slaves. As a result of this joint effort,
Catholics and Protestants found more similarities than differences in the transAppalachian wilderness.149
In Kentucky, Catholics joined Protestants in waging battle against American
Indian opponents. On the frontier, a near-perpetual state of conflict existed between
settlers and Indians until General Anthony Wayne’s victory at the Battle of Fallen
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Timbers in 1794.150 Throughout these years, Catholics filled companies and joined
expeditions to defend white settlements. Although the danger decreased substantially
after 1795, Catholic commitment to American military ventures persisted. As Father
Stephen Theodore Badin, author of an 1804 report to the Sacred Congregation for the
Propagation of the Faith (also known as “Propaganda”), reported, Kentucky Catholics
participated regularly in the “political, civil, and military activities of the state.”151
Additionally, Catholic clergy west of the Appalachian Mountains publicly blessed
American soldiers and prayed for their victories.152 Catholics in early Kentucky also
proclaimed their esteem for American liberality and religious freedom. The first
newspapers printed by Catholic settlers in Kentucky praised the country despite its
overwhelmingly Protestant composition. On August 25, 1824, Kentucky’s Catholic
Miscellany echoed these patriotic sentiments, proclaiming that “although our creed
differs from the opinion of the great bulk of the American people, we do not know, and
have now known in several thousands of miles traveling with the inhabitants of various
nations, a more correct and well conducted people.”153 In this nineteenth century
Catholic vision, religious liberty distinguished the American character and set it apart
from older nations.154
Another essay in the early Miscellany contrasted the treatment of American
Catholics favorably against their counterparts in Europe, noting that in “looking over our
communications from Europe, we have frequently to congratulate ourselves upon our
150
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state of religious freedom at this side of the Atlantic. . . . The American people and the
American government have done all they could or ought to do.”155 One Catholic writer in
Kentucky contrasted the religious freedoms of the early republic with nineteenth century
Britain’s blinkered religious laws. Reflecting on the American Revolution and the
extension of religious liberty to Catholics in most parts of the United States, the writer
noted that Americans implemented “an act of plain justice and political wisdom . . .
which the parent country, after a lapse of nearly fifty years, has not yet had the
magnanimity to perform.”156 Catholics’ sense of security was reflected in their efforts to
persuade or convert Protestants in the region. Kentucky Catholics employed a number of
outreaching methods. Through religious processions, targeted preaching, and verbal as
well as written arguments, Catholic priests and bishops worked to gain ground
throughout the trans-Appalachian West.157 Catholic proselytization to non-Catholics in
the region became more widespread in the 1810s and 1820s. Gradually, these efforts
among Protestants resulted in some inroads.
Catholic successes, however, brought increased suspicion from Protestant
neighbors. In promoting the faith outside their own churches, clergy in many cases
aggravated relations with Protestant Americans. By the 1830s, the Catholic Church in
Kentucky stood in stark contrast to the expansionist organization of the early nineteenth
century. Increased tension transformed Catholicism in the United States into a largely
defensive and insular immigrant church.158 Even prior to the surge of nativism in the midnineteenth century, sporadic and often destructive forms of anti-Catholicism perturbed
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members of the Church’s hierarchy. In 1835, Charlestown, Massachusetts experienced
the most infamous episode of anti-Catholic destruction, when a mob set fire to an
Ursuline convent following rumors of forced conversion attempts. Such violence also
reflected the influence of a growing anti-Catholic literature that portrayed Catholicism as
a direct threat to America’s political independence.159 Throughout the 1830s to 1840s,
anti-Catholic literature captivated and moved readers with a number of highly popular
works.
In the autumn of 1834, for example, artist and inventor Samuel F. B. Morse
published series of letters, charging that the monarchies of Europe enlisted the aid of the
Catholic Church to subvert the spread of democracy. Morse asserted that the Church led
this effort by sending Catholic immigrants to take control of the under-populated
American West.160 Further, Morse claimed that the Leopold Association, founded in
Vienna in 1829 to finance the building of Catholic churches in America, fronted this
operation to undermine American democracy.161 In linking immigration, which
Americans previously considered beneficial, to Roman Catholicism, which most
Americans distrusted, Morse kindled the growing flames of American nativism. Two
additional works of popular literature revived Americans’ anti-Roman fears. Utilizing a
conspiracy argument similar to Morse’s, the influential Lyman Beecher’s A Plea for the
West (1835) denounced the influence of Catholic schools and the danger they posed to
America’s children. The following year, Maria Monk’s explosive Awful Disclosures of
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the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal, or, The Hidden Secrets of a Nun’s Life in a Convent
Exposed, captivated readers and stoked even more anti-Catholic fervor. Fabricated with
lurid descriptions of illicit convent sexual practices, Monk’s work sold more copies in the
United States than any other book until Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin in
1852.162
In response to growing anti-Catholic literature, a number of priests printed
pamphlets and periodicals in defense of the Church. In Kentucky, editors of the Catholic
Advocate reassured its Bardstown readership that “persecution is wisely permitted to try
the fidelity of God’s servants, to purify and disengage them from this earth; and to prove
that God can preserve his Church against all human opposition.”163 Other Church
defenders continued to blame anti-Catholic sentiment on lingering British sensibilities in
the United States. Bishop Martin John Spalding also blamed English beliefs, tracing
prejudices in Kentucky to “the erroneous opinions which their forefathers had inherited
from England.”164 The Catholic Miscellany similarly declared that the “children of old
England have discarded everything English, but their English intolerance.”165
Even some Protestant writers asserted that Catholic newspapers “deal[ing] with
religious controversies and differences of opinion” were “one of the means which have
worked best in dissipating the prejudices which the Protestants had spread about
everywhere against Catholics.”166 Likewise, in a published response to Lyman Beecher’s
A Plea to the West in 1835, editor James Hall called for Protestant readers to consider
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“the Catholic Question” in a rational and civil fashion. “Why cannot [the] peculiar
opinions [of Catholics] be opposed by argument, by persuasion, by remonstrance,” Hall
implored, “as one Christian sect should oppose another.”167 After all, Hall continued, “we
speak kindly of the Jew, and even of the heathen; there are those that love a Negro or a
Cherokee even better than their own flesh and blood; but a Catholic is an abomination,
for whom there is no law, no charity, no bond of Christian fraternity?”168
Growing differences between Catholicism and American Protestantism partially
explain the lack of “Christian fraternity.” In the nineteenth century, most Americans
believed Protestantism responsible for the freedom and prosperity their country enjoyed.
Conversely, Roman Catholicism and its rigid hierarchal structure seemed hostile to nearly
everything Americans in the early republic valued.169 The American people’s devotion to
“republicanism” inspired a great deal of anti-Catholicism. Protestant Americans believed
the seemingly unlimited control that the Catholic hierarchy exercised over its followers
deprived them of the independence necessary to participate in a republican
government.170 “The people made this government, and not the government the people,”
wrote Charles Francis Adams. He added that an influx of “a different people,” schooled
in the traditions of absolutism, would undermine American institutions.171
As a rising number of Protestant denominations rejected the concept of religious
hierarchy altogether, many viewed the Catholic Church’s authority structure with
increased suspicion and mistrust. As Francis Patrick Kenrick, the Irish-born Archbishop
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of Baltimore asserted, “Protestants are accustomed to rant about the hatred of the Church
for popular liberty and her liking for authority, affirming that everything in the Church is
done with a certain tyranny.”172 Nativists embraced these sentiments, asserting that
Democratic Party bosses and the Catholic Church colluded control immigrant voters. In
Louisville, the connection between Germans and the Democratic Party proved so strong
that the city’s German Democratic Association resolved: “We request every German to
register his name on the protocol book; and that every one who leaves the party without
giving his reasons before a public meeting, shall be published in the papers as a Fellow
Worthy to Be Recognized As A Contuemner [sic] of the German Nation.”173
Voices within the Native American and American Republican movements
attributed these tendencies to foreigners being “by education and custom . . . more
submissive to the voice of authority” than native-born Americans.174 In turn, Protestant
assimilationists, both in Kentucky and nationally, embraced an extreme vision of the
“melting pot” concept in which numerous cultures amalgamated into a single American
identity. In their view, they hoped and expected the dominant British-Protestant culture to
absorb all else.175 These nativists shared the “Anglo-conformity” outlook, demanding the
complete renunciation by immigrant groups of their Old World cultural ancestry, and an
unqualified commitment to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture of the United States.176
The “melting pot” concept provided their ideal over a pluralist culture in which divergent
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ethnic groups live in more or less segregated enclaves.177 Echoing this belief, the New
York Times advised immigrants not to “herd themselves together for the preservation of
their customs, habits, and languages of the country from which they came.”178 The Times
claimed it the “duty” of each arriving immigrant to “thoroughly Americanize themselves”
upon entrance into the country.179 Assimilationists rejected the claim that the customs and
Catholicism of newly arrived immigrants could become part of any true American
identity.
Irish and German Immigration, 1840s-1850s
By the 1840s, rising immigration from Ireland and Germany greatly contributed to the
growth of American nativism. Immigration to the United States had not always generated
negative connotations among native-born Americans. After the Revolution, most
Americans looked favorably and even eagerly across the Atlantic for new citizens. In
fact, in the Declaration of Independence, colonists complained that George III
“endeavored to prevent the population of these States” by “obstructing the Laws of
Naturalization of Foreigners” and by “refusing to pass others to encourage their migration
hither.”180 The open-armed acceptance of immigrants shifted as Catholic newcomers to
the United States outnumbered Protestants.
Although Ireland and the German states supplied most of the immigrants to
America during the first half of the nineteenth century, their backgrounds and reasons for
emigrating altered over time.181 From 1812 to 1832, most Irish immigrants to the United
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States tended to include Presbyterians or Anglicans from the island’s northern region.182
The small number of Catholics who emigrated were “the most enterprising, industrious,
virtuous part” of the Irish Catholic population, consisting chiefly of well-to-do farmers
and middle class city dwellers. Further, the immigrants arriving in these years typically
brought business or artisanal skills with them.183 Those without such skills often included
successful farmers, as a “substantial minority” of immigrants either bought farmland
immediately or worked in eastern cities until they saved enough money to purchase
farmland in the West. The high cost of the Atlantic crossing further discouraged the
unskilled and poor tenant farmers from emigrating before 1830.184
During the mid-1830s, the number of Irish emigrating to the United States
increased dramatically, and their socioeconomic backgrounds changed as well. As
southern and western Irish surpassed the northerners as the chief source of immigrants,
Catholics became a majority of voyagers. Likewise, unskilled laborers outnumbered
skilled emigrants as the 1830s continued.185 By 1836, unskilled laborers represented
almost 60 percent of Irish immigrants to the United States, up from only 21 percent in
1820.186 The falling costs of cross-Atlantic travel and advanced speed further encouraged
immigrants to make the voyage. Earlier arrivals to the United States spurred emigration
with letters, speaking positively about their new home, where failure seemed nearly
impossible.187 Successful new immigrants also spurred immigration by sending money
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from America that paid the fares of over half the Irish passengers in the late 1830s.188
Still, extreme poverty provided the most pertinent reason for Irish emigration in
the mid-1840s. Overpopulation made farmland increasingly scarce. The shortage of land
made subsistence in rural areas more difficult. As the size of food plots decreased, a
“rapid and dangerous” decline in living standards occurred after 1830.189 Increasing
Catholic discontent with British rule further encouraged many to seek a new life in
America.190 The addition of the potato blight in 1845 rendered life nearly unbearable.
Caused by a fungus that made the leaves of the potato plant turn black and crumble,
farmers first believed the potatoes themselves might be salvageable. However, seemingly
healthy potatoes proved inedible when they rotted soon after harvest.191 In 1845, the
blight destroyed 30 to 40 percent of the Irish potato crop, enabling family and
governmental relief to stave off starvation in most places. In 1846, however, the potato
fungus reduced nearly the entire crop to “one wide waste of putrefying vegetation.”192
The 1847 harvest temporarily renewed farmers’ faith in the possibility of potato growth,
but each subsequent year brought potato harvests less than half the pre-blight levels.193
During the famine years, an estimated one million to one and a half million Irish citizens
died of starvation or related causes out of the pre-famine population of over eight
million.194 Another two million decided to leave Ireland completely, and nearly three-
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quarters of that number emigrated to the United States.195
Though they received less publicity than the Irish, nearly as many German
immigrants settled in the United States during the same years. Indeed, German
immigration grew to unprecedented levels between 1844 and 1854.196 Like the Irish,
many Germans emigrated because of overpopulation. With arable land becoming more
scarce and expensive, numerous German farmers sought affordable western land in
America. Moreover, industrialization and competition from England made obtaining a
decent living more difficult for German artisans. The growing unification of the German
economy further aggravated the situation, as the removal of internal tolls and duties
undermined the ability of artisans living in less industrially advanced sections of the
country to compete with those in neighboring states.197
As German and Irish immigrants flooded into America, most initially settled in
urban areas, including a number of southern cities. Indeed, Louisville soon joined New
Orleans and St. Louis as one of the three chief cities on inland waterways attracting
immigrants. By 1850, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri contained over two-thirds of
the total foreign population in the South.198 The same year, over 20,000 Catholics lived in
Kentucky and 4 percent of the state’s residents claimed foreign birth.199 Compared to
other hotbeds of nativist sentiment, such as New York (21 percent) and Massachusetts
(16 percent), the numbers of the foreign born in Kentucky were low.200 However, a
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sizable majority of the foreign concentration lay in Louisville, and nearly one in three of
the city’s residents claimed foreign birth in the 1850 census.201
Louisville and its surrounding area attracted antebellum immigrants for a number
of reasons. By the 1840s, Louisville had become a flourishing manufacturing center and
shipping port.202 The increasing availability of work made the city especially appealing to
immigrants venturing as far west as the Ohio River. Other parts of the state also attracted
foreign-born workers as railroad contractors busily recruited cheap foreign labor for the
construction of various railways, including the line connecting Maysville and
Lexington.203 By 1850, Germans totaled 13,607 people in Kentucky, both within
Louisville and outside the city. Kenton and Campbell Counties, each with slightly over
three thousand foreign born, also maintained active German communities in their largest
urban centers of Covington and Newport.204 Likewise, Lexington, Maysville, and
Paducah, attracted a combined population of about 1,800 German immigrants. German
farmers also settled in a number of Kentucky’s northern counties.205
Anti-Catholicism and Fears of Papal Overreach
As immigration numbers boomed in the 1840s, a tangible backlash swelled among many
Protestant Americans. In Louisville, an energetic branch of the Protestant Reformation
Society formed and supplied Protestant religious journals with a steady barrage of attacks
on foreign Catholicism.206 By the late 1840s, the columns of Kentucky newspapers
printed the reports of Protestant religious conferences that emphasized the “Catholic
201
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menace.” Fear of Catholic indoctrination through Church-run educational institutions
remained a key concern. The Louisville Courier printed a piece echoing these fears
following resolutions adopted at the Methodist Episcopal Conference of Tennessee in
1844, declaring:
It is manifest, that the Roman Church proposes to secure the ascendancy in this
country, chiefly by means of literary institutions of every grade, in which, by the
aid of foreign funds, they are able to hold out extraordinary inducements, to gain
the patronage of the community, and are seeking, especially in this way, to bring
the Protestant youth of this country under their influence.207
Despite these claims, many Protestant parents continued to send their children to
Kentucky’s Catholic institutions as the state provided few alternatives in the antebellum
era.208 Since Kentucky failed to give public schools a constitutional status until 1849,
private academies fulfilled the demand.209
Growing signs of nativist sentiment appeared in a growing number of newspapers
as well. As the Shelby News added the inscription “AMERICANS SHALL RULE
AMERICA” to its masthead, the Louisville Courier began espousing nativist causes
under Walter Haldeman’s editorship.210 These former Whig organs ventured further into
anti-party waters by endorsing candidates outside of the two main parties. In fact, during
the 1847 and 1849 congressional elections, the Courier supported Stephen F. J. Trabue,
the nativist candidate for Congress, over the Whig candidate in the Ashland district.
Though ultimately unsuccessful in both bids, Trabue managed to garner a respectable
share of the popular vote in both contests, thanks in part to the Courier’s public
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support.211
Still, most of Kentucky’s major newspapers eschewed the movement. To the ire
of nativist sympathizers, the Louisville Journal and Yeoman vied with each other in
welcoming foreigners to the state well into the 1852 contest.212 During this time, leaders
of both Democratic and Whig camps attempted to tar the other with the label of antiforeigner and anti-Catholicism. In most campaigns the Democratic presses began the
round of charges, leading to Whig denials and countercharges. Throughout the 1840s and
early 1850s, both Kentucky’s Democratic and Whig parties attempted to present
themselves as better friends to Catholics and naturalized citizens.213 In 1852, however, a
number of nativist-leaning presses in Kentucky rejected the practice of vying for
immigrant votes. Instead, they implored Kentucky’s candidates to focus their attention
solely on the state’s native Protestants. “We feel,” one editor of a sectarian Kentucky
paper wrote during the 1852 presidential contest, “that it is time for Protestants to begin
to enquire how far they will tolerate this pandering in politicians of the ignorant and
bigoted Romanists who have come to us from foreign countries.”214
Not only Catholic immigrants incurred the wrath of Kentucky nativists. The
Protestants who formed the National Central Union of Free Germans with its national
headquarters in Louisville also fell under the label of “Godless Germans.”215 By 1851, the
German population of Louisville had increased to nearly one-third of the city’s total
population, and they had established a variety of religious, social, and economic
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institutions. In 1851, for example, the city contained ten German churches, eight
Protestant and two Catholic.216 A male orphanage supported exclusively by the German
Catholics, a German Baptist orphanage, two parochial schools, a bank, a Germanlanguage press, and social organizations increased the visibility of this recently
naturalized group.217
The arrival of European revolutionaries of 1848 further fueled nativist tendencies.
Though sympathy first met immigrants whom many Americans believed espoused
republican political values, the initial support soon vanished. In Louisville, conservative
citizens became outraged as labor union leaders, revolutionary writers, and radical editors
settled within the city. Among these radicals were August Willich, a member of the
London Communist League along with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who arrived in
Louisville in 1852. Wilhelm Weitling, a fellow socialist and leading figure in the German
labor movement, also lived for a short time in the city, rousing followers to his cause.218
Carl Heinzen, a German revolutionary, also resided in Louisville, heading a labor union
and publishing his doctrine Herold des Westens.219
Likewise, the activity of the German press stirred native-born indignation toward
foreigners. In the Louisville Anzeiger, George Philip Doern and Otto Schaefer reported
European news in the German language to their wide readership.220 In 1854, nativist
resentment grew when former German revolutionaries promulgated the “Louisville
Platform.” The “Platform” condemned European despots, race and class privilege, the
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institution of slavery, Jesuits, and the Pope.221 Conservative Kentuckians condemned the
“agitators” who joined German labor unions, believing the breakdown of American
society and government their sole focus.222 Tension over slavery compounded nativist
suspicion of German immigrants. In 1854, Louisville became the headquarters of Bund
Freier Manner—the League of Free Men—a radical German group whose platforms
called for the immediate emancipation of slaves.223 Moreover, all three German language
newspapers in Louisville lent their voices to the abolitionist cause. Although these
“radicals” represented only a portion of the German community, they proved highly
visible to nativist onlookers.224 As a result of the Bund Freier Manner and German
abolitionist sentiment, nativists labeled all Germans in Louisville as radicals and
abolitionist troublemakers.
In the 1850s, educational disputes grew in significance, though the focus shifted
from Catholic institutions to a broader debate about public schooling. These debates
further alienated Catholics and Protestants. In 1853, Bishop Spalding wrote the Louisville
Board of Education complaining about the use of Protestant Bibles in the public schools
and argued that all citizens funded the schools, regardless of religion. Stating that the
independently organized and funded Catholic schools should also receive public money,
Spalding asserted that Catholics paid taxes “to support a system from which they
received no benefit.”225 Spalding’s complaint changed little; the Protestant Bible
continued to be utilized in schools.
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Changes within the Catholic Church also prompted Protestant fears during the
1850s. During the papacy of Pius IX (1846-1878), the Church entered a period of
reaction.226 Deemed a “violent enemy of liberalism and social reform” during the 184849 revolutions and wars of unification in Italy, Pius IX proclaimed the doctrine of papal
infallibility. In his Syllabus of Errors, Pius condemned socialism, public education, and
rationalism. The latter two points caused particular indignation amongst American
Protestants. “It is an error,” declared the pope, “to believe that the Roman Pontiff can and
ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and modern
civilization.”227 Not surprisingly, the rhetoric of Pius IX widened the growing chasm
between American Protestants and newly arriving Catholics.
As a partial result of the Church’s conservative rhetoric, many Protestant
Americans feared any visible sign of perceived papal authority in the United States. Signs
of papal overreach such as the “Bedini Incident” caused reverberations from New York
to Kentucky. From June 1853 to February 1854, the visit of Papal Nuncio Monsignor
Gaetano Bedini resulted in a firestorm of outrage.228 After arriving to adjudicate property
disputes in certain American dioceses, Bedini toured the United States, bestowing the
“Papal blessing” on American Catholics in a number of cities.229 In response, the
Protestant and nativist press erupted in frenzy. Throughout Bedini’s visit, rumors had
spread that Pius IX sent the envoy only to bolster the Church’s position in the United
States and make Bedini a permanent fixture. “He is here,” proclaimed one journal, “to
find the best way to rivet Italian chains upon us which will bind us as free slaves to the
226
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throne of the most fierce tyranny the world knows.”230 Pius IX and the Catholic Church’s
role in suppressing Italian nationalist uprisings in 1848-1849 also aroused radical
expatriates from several Catholic countries against Bedini, whom they christened “the
Butcher of Bologna.”231
Bedini’s tour provoked overt displays of anger along with regular charges of
Catholic oppression in the press. After a tumultuous visit to Cincinnati, Bedini came to
Louisville in December 1853 at the invitation of Bishop Spalding and was received by a
raucous crowd.232 After news of Bedini’s arrival in Louisville, the crowd marched to the
intersection of Market and Floyd Streets, burning both the Pope and Bishop Spalding’s
effigy amid insulting jeers.233 As Bedini’s tour through American cities continued, riots
erupted in several locations. Bedini’s visit proved so volatile that in February 1854 his
handlers smuggled him aboard a ship in New York City harbor to escape threats of mob
violence and ensure his safe departure for Italy.234 The “Bedini Incident” served as a
prelude to the Know Nothing activity that swept the United States within a few short
years.
Though Native American and American Republican groups had existed in
Kentucky since the 1840s, the animus against the foreign-born became more audible in
the 1850s. As the nativist sentiment grew, new Know Nothing lodges appeared.
Covington was the first Kentucky city to report the establishment of a Know Nothing
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Party “wigwam.”235 In addition, the Covington Journal remained alert to immigrant
slights, protesting private meetings held by the newly arrived German and Irish
immigrants:
In political affairs we protest against all attempts to create classes, to excite the
prejudice of one portion of the people against another portion, to all clannishness,
and any nationality save American nationality.236
The influential Presbyterian minister, the Reverend Robert J. Breckinridge,
became one of Kentucky’s leading voices of nativism. Throughout the 1850s,
Breckinridge’s correspondence and printed editorials contained numerous calls for
citizens to combat “Popish plots” and prevent the state’s politicians from making
concessions to “Papists.”237 He also encouraged Kentuckians to assist in spreading antiCatholic literature exposing the “secret springs and vast machine of Popery.”238
As charges against the Catholic Church increased, Louisville’s Bishop Spalding
attempted to neutralize their effects. On January 4, 1855, a “notorious Italian renegade,”
Giovanni Giacinto Achilli, addressed the Young Men’s Christian Association of
Louisville in a lecture entitled “Popery Unmasked and Revealed to American Youth,”
one of a series “embracing subjects of novelty and interest” according to the Louisville
Journal.239 The editor of the Louisville Times announced the “distinguished Italian exile”
and expressed the wish that the bishop might give a public response since the lecturer had
ties to the Know Nothing movement.240 At the Cathedral of the Assumption, newly
erected in 1852, Spalding’s rebuttal, an “apologia for the Catholic faith,” attracted a
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crowd of Catholics and Protestants.241 The series, which Spalding styled “Popular
Prejudices against the Catholic Church,” included such subjects as “the Anti-Popery
Crusade,” the “Power of the Pope,” and the “Confessional and Secret Societies.”242 The
controversy provided the Church hierarchy an opportunity to challenge anti-Catholic
arguments before the Louisville public. In the political arena, however, Spalding’s
attempts failed to prevent nativist headway.
The Politics of Kentucky’s Know Nothing Party
In 1854, the Know Nothing Party bounded swiftly onto the political stage. The party’s
rise in Kentucky proved especially rapid. The state’s nativist lodges proved instrumental
in fueling the groundswell for the Know Nothing Party. A product of earlier Native
American and American Republican movements, the organizations hardly changed their
rhetoric. For example, an 1847 address to nativist supporters in the Fayette Congressional
District proclaimed:
The moral and physical energies of our beloved country are threatened with a
fatal paralysis, and the motive of self-preservation should impel every true
American to rally around the standard of his country, and make a bold and
determined resistance to the evils which threaten its destruction. . . . Already our
northern, eastern, and southern cities are filled to overflowing with poor, diseased,
and degraded immigrants. . . . A remedy, fellow citizens, is loudly and
imperiously called for. Let us begin to do something now.243
In the 1850s, a rush of Kentuckians gravitated to the cause. As the nativist
movement picked up steam, local nativist organizations used county and municipal
elections to test their strength against local Whig and Democratic Party structures.244 In
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the summer of 1854, Kentucky’s nativist organizations undertook their first organized
political move. In Louisville, Lexington, and Covington, home to the three largest
concentrations of immigrants in Kentucky, nativist lodges and their political allies
barnstormed local elections and achieved resounding victories.245 Local candidates in the
antebellum era usually announced themselves only several weeks prior to Election Day.
In 1854, the Know Nothings secretly selected a slate of candidates for office in these
three cities, but contenders only announced themselves before the polling day. These lateannouncing Know Nothing candidates overwhelmed their Whig and Democratic
opponents with clearly well-organized support. This pattern repeated itself several
months later in municipal elections in the three largest cities and throughout the state.246
Shortly after the establishment of the state’s Know Nothing organization,
Kentucky sent delegates to the party’s Grand Council meeting in June 1854. Less than
two months later, the Know Nothings elected an entire ticket for local offices in
Louisville.247 As 1854 continued, the American Party claimed further victories
throughout the state, proving most effective in former Whig strongholds.248 In the fall, the
Know Nothings enjoyed victories in Pulaski, Kenton, Covington, Carroll, Jessamine,
Logan, and Breckinridge Counties.249 The movement proved so successful that on
September 30, 1854, Louisville’s Know Nothing Party placed a candidate for mayor in
the field on the day of balloting and successfully elected him.250
Internal divisions over how to respond to Know Nothing arguments and
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allegations further weakened the two major parties. In late 1854, Whig leaders remained
undecided on what course they should take to route the American Party challengers.
Some Whig leaders argued the party should maintain its current course and weather the
storms of sectionalism, temperance, and nativist agitation. Other leaders, however, did
not want to give up the Whig label, but called on the party to make peace with nativist
elements in the state as a means to renew strength.251 Certainly, a growing number of
Kentucky Whig newspapers opted for this second option. On May 30, 1854, Frankfort’s
influential Commonwealth newspaper championed the Know Nothing cause.252 As the
year continued, Know Nothings picked up additional editorial support from other Whig
organs in Kentucky, including the Shelby News and the Louisville Courier. These papers
often castigated Kentucky’s established leadership, reflecting anti-party sentiment, while
simultaneously cheering Know Nothing victories.253
Still in late 1854, a number of Whig outlets continued to reject the drift toward
Know Nothingism. The Bardstown Herald, located in the heart of heavily Catholic
Nelson County, led the charge against the Know Nothing Party, and demanded Whig
unification. Arguing that secret nativist societies posed greater dangers to the liberties of
the United States than foreigners or Catholics, the Herald doubted the wisdom of allying
with a group whose principles failed in their eyes to “champion long term viability.”254
The Herald also believed the Democrats more dangerous than nativists, pointing out that
the nation seemed more poorly governed under Franklin Pierce than at any time in its
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past.255
The majority of former Whig outlets in the state, however, failed to endorse the
Herald’s rejection of Know Nothing tenets. Instead, most Whig newspapers followed the
lead of the Louisville Journal, hewing a middle course designed to maintain the existence
of the Whig Party and win over the Know Nothings, or at least neutralize them
politically. As the returns of the fall 1854 elections revealed Know Nothing gains
throughout the country, the Journal viewed the American Party as a potential ally of
southern Whigs and attempted to woo Know Nothing voters with fawning editorial
pieces. Most observers believed, however, that the paper’s efforts to assuage Know
Nothing voters were an attempt to forestall a separate Know Nothing nomination for
governor in 1855.256
Though the issues of immigration and naturalization remained the American
Party’s primary concern, they also sought to preserve the Union. Claiming old Whig
nationalist rhetoric, Know Nothings castigated zealots who cared more for section than
Union. In its simplest form, nativists would, as one Maryland Know Nothing stated,
“hold the tongue on the Negro issue,” remaining “silent and abstain[ing] from agitation
and instead celebrate the Union.”257 No contest over slavery was worth disrupting the
Union, Know Nothings argued, and they placed those who played the politics of
sectionalism along with Roman Catholics, politicians, and the foreign born, on their list
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of enemies.258 Indeed, the party’s platform called for sectional peace under the motto of
Senator Daniel Webster’s famous speech, “Liberty and Union now and forever, one and
inseparable.”259
Many Kentucky Whigs found the Know Nothing’s pro-Union stance especially
attractive. The effectively proslavery prospect of keeping the issue out of politics
appealed to many such voters in the border states.260 Prentice echoed these unionist
sentiments in the Louisville Journal. As late as April 1855, Prentice still advocated the
dying Whig cause and voiced opposition to the Know Nothing exclusion of Catholics and
immigrants from office, but he later cited unionism as a major cause for his conversion to
the American Party.261 “Probably the most ominous and momentous question now
agitating is that of slavery,” argued Prentice. “This question, infinitely more than any
other . . . threatens to dissolve the Union. The crisis is perilous, and, in this crisis, the
American Party is the only one that can be relied on to save the country.”262 To preserve
the Union, Prentice urged other former Whigs to join him in the Know Nothing cause.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 delivered the death blow to the national Whig
Party. By repealing the Missouri Compromise and opening Kansas and Nebraska
territories to popular sovereignty, the act intensified the sectional conflict ad opened the
floodgates for open conflict between proslavery and antislavery forces in the West. As a
result of the act’s passage, many former Whigs and northern Democrats concluded that
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the Know Nothings offered the only alternative to the sectional strife.263 In a growing
number of minds, the Whig and Democratic Parties both seemed incompetent to hold the
union together. The Know Nothings, with their blend of anti-immigrant, anti-party, and
pro-union sentiment, seemed the best alternative. To distract voters from the sectional
conflict, the Know Nothings directed the bulk of their attention toward the immigrant as
enemy.264 Championing themselves as defenders of the union and liberty, Know
Nothings castigated foreigners and southern secessionists alike, though not always in
equal measure. While Kentuckians like L. C. Porter resented the manipulation of
immigrant voters by the Democrats, he remained more pleased that the Know Nothings
espoused unionist sentiment, arguing that they took a bold stand against his three greatest
concerns: “abolitionism, secession, and drunkenness.”265
The Know Nothing appeal to fight abolition suited southern political discourse,
but the argument faced hostility in some northern ranks. Blasting the Know Nothing
Party as a red herring, northern Free Soilers argued that the nativist cause diverted
attention from the real issue of slavery.266 “Neither the Pope nor the foreigners can
govern the country or endanger its liberties,” wrote Charles A. Dana, managing editor of
the New York Tribune, “but the slaveholders and slavebreeders do govern it.”267
Congressman George Julian of Indiana even suspected that this “distracting crusade
against the Pope and foreigners” was a “cunning” scheme devised by proslavery interests
“to divide the people of the free states upon trifles and side issues, while the South
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remained a unit in defense of its great[est] interest.”268
The slavery issue eventually capsized the American Party, but in the mid-1850s
its members discounted the arguments of Free Soilers and other northern naysayers.
Decrying sectionalism and projecting themselves as protectors of the country, Know
Nothings compared their anti-party and anti-foreign crusade to the patriots of the past
who arrayed themselves against “the pretensions of the British Crown and its partisan
factions.”269 Like the Founding Fathers, Know Nothings asserted that they sought to
combat the “political decadence” of their age.270 The nativist attack on parties originated
not from anti-institutional individualism but the nativist desire to replace hackneyed
politicians with the leaders of “Young America”—just as eighty years before the first
Americans sought to remove Britain’s influence. Anti-party sentiments proved responsive
to the growing feeling that America as an organic unity was disappearing amid its
citizens’ commitments to more powerful religions, ethnic allegiances, and party
organizations. In the face of these threats, Know Nothings sought to intertwine party,
nation, and religion in a transcendent Americanism.271
In addition, some historians argue that gender played a significant part in the
appeal of Kentucky’s Know Nothing Party. To explain the appeal of nativism in
southern states, particularly its attraction to voters outside urban areas where the bulk of
immigrants resided, historians have identified the role of masculinity. Many former
Whigs joined the American Party because they could not fathom an alliance with the
Democrats, and others sincerely believed the party’s aversion to foreign influence.
268
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However, neither former Whigs’ antipathy to longtime enemies nor anti-immigrant
proposals can fully explain the conversions to Know Nothingism in the rural areas of the
state.272 Among such Kentuckians, the American Party appealed to notions of
masculinity, and specifically independence. White men considered independence a
necessary condition of manhood. Kentucky’s Know Nothing Party stressed their political
independence from Whigs and Democrats as a key foundation of their movement. The
refusal to be subservient to either major party provided Know Nothing voters an outlet
for demonstrating their own personal independence. The Know Nothings constituted a
party, but a significant aspect of their appeal depended on their position outside the
established party system.273 The rise of Kentucky’s American Party especially outside
urban areas suggests that the party appealed to southern men’s definition of independence
and masculinity.
The broad appeal of the Know Nothing Party enabled it to gain an astounding
amount of political support by the end of 1854. The “Platform and Principles of the
American Party” adopted by their National Council at Philadelphia the following year
included as many of these elements as possible under the umbrella. Kentuckian E. B.
Bartlett of Covington played a key role in the convention as delegates elected him their
national council president. In their list of principles, the party listed the issues of
immigration third and Anti-Romanism fifth in terms of importance. Instead, Know
Nothing members cited unionism as their main political focus. After “acknowledgement
of the Almighty Being,” the party platform insisted on the importance of “the cultivation
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and development of sentiment of profoundly intense American feeling.”274 The platform
echoed the party’s goal of “opposition to all attempts to weaken or subvert . . . the union
of these United States,” and castigated “the tendencies to political division founded on
the belief that there is a real difference of interests and views between the various
sections of the Union.”275 Reverence to the Constitution also made the top of the
American Party list of principles, as members called for an “emulation of the virtue,
wisdom, and patriotism that framed our Constitution and first successfully applied its
provisions.”276
Following statements expressing unionism and patriotic sentiment, the American
Party platform called for lawfulness among citizens and “a habit of reverential obedience
to the laws, whether National, State, or Municipal,” adding “until they are either repealed
or declared unconstitutional by the proper authority.”277 Third, Know Nothing members
made clear their dissatisfaction with the current immigration laws of the United States.
The document requested:
A radical revision and modification of the laws regulating immigration, and the
settlement of immigrants. Offering to the honest immigrant, who, from love of
liberty or hatred of oppression, seeks an asylum in the United States, a friendly
reception and protection. But unqualifiedly condemning the transmission to our
shores of felons and paupers.278
The continued influence of anti-party sentiment within Know Nothing quarters
also appeared in the party’s national platform as members expressed “hostility to the
corrupt means by which the leaders of part[ies] have . . . forced upon us our rulers and
274
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our political creeds” and “disgust for the wild hunt after office which characterizes the
age.”279 American Party members offered anti-Catholic principles only after unionism,
lawfulness, revised immigration laws, and anti-party expressions. The American Party’s
anti-Catholic plank called for:
Resistance to the aggressive policy and corrupting tendencies of the Roman
Catholic
Church in our country by the advancement to all political
stations—executive, legislative, judicial, or diplomatic—of those only who do not
hold civic allegiance, directly or indirectly, to any foreign power whether civil or
ecclesiastical, and who are Americans by birth, education, and training—thus
fulfilling the maxim ‘AMERICANS ONLY SHALL GOVERN AMERICA.’280
Three additional beliefs also made their way into the bottom of the party’s list of
principles: anti-cronyism, public education, and the rejection of the “systematic agitation
of the slavery question.” The party’s anti-cronyism plank requested the “restriction of
executive patronage, especially in appointments to office, so far as it may be permitted by
the Constitution, and consistent with the public good.”281 Reviving old Whig support for
strengthening public education, the platform called for “the education of the youth of our
country in schools provided by the State, which schools shall be common to all, without
distinction of creed or party, and free from any influence or direction of a denominational
or patrizan [sic] character.”282
Harkening back to Henry Clay’s calls for compromise, the Know Nothing
platform called on citizens to preserve the Union by resisting sectional rhetoric on the
issue of slavery. Asking supporters to reject thoroughly the “systematic agitation of the
slavery question . . . for the purpose of giving peace to the country and perpetuity to the
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Union,” the platform concluded:
The National Council has deemed it the best guarantee of common justice and of
future peace, to abide by and maintain the existing laws upon the subject of
slavery. . . . Congress possesses no power under the Constitution, to legislate upon
the subject of slaves in the States where it does or may exist, or to exclude any
State from admission into the Union because its constitution does or does not
recognize the institution of slavery as a part of its social system.283
With the party platforms and principles clearly stated, members marched forth to their
respective states seeking more political victories. In Kentucky, the party’s principles had
a mixed appeal. The American Party’s official stances of unionism, reverence for the
Constitution, public education, and compromise over slavery appealed to former Whigs.
More “radical” Know Nothing views toward immigrants, Catholicism, and the rejection
of old party methods, however, alienated many old-line Whigs. In Kentucky, 1855
proved both the party’s political apex and sowed the seeds of its collapse.
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CHAPTER III
“PARTY RAGE AND NATIONALISTIC ARROGANCE”: THE BLOODY MONDAY
RIOTS, THE KNOW NOTHING APEX AND COLLAPSE
After twenty-five years as editor of Kentucky’s most widely read Whig paper, the
Louisville Journal, George D. Prentice long held onto the hope that his old party would
survive. By April 1855, political reality comforted Prentice. The Whig Party’s national
collapse had convinced a growing number of former members to ally themselves with the
Know Nothings, and Prentice followed suit.284 The transition caused many Journal
readers to wonder if the publication would lose its former influence. Five years earlier,
Prentice had bragged about the wide reach and impact of the Journal, claiming his paper
reached “into every precinct of the State, into every county of the whole West and South,
and into very many portions of the middle and eastern states and of Europe. . . . Our
circulation is greater than the aggregate circulation of any three other newspapers in
Kentucky.”285 By 1855, however, the Journal’s influence had deteriorated with Prentice’s
calls for Whig reunification falling on deaf ears and the Know Nothing movement
gaining adherents. In January 1855, the Louisville Times estimated the state’s Know
Nothing Party enjoyed the support of fifty thousand voters.286 The year also brought
Know Nothing victories in the former Whig stronghold of Lexington and previously
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Democratic Covington.287
Despite the fact that many Kentuckians had abandoned the Whigs, the Louisville
Journal and Prentice still retained a large and enthused readership. Known for his
“unusual wit and intelligence,” Prentice’s words drew increasing attention and
controversy as the year continued.288 The nineteenth century was an age of “personal
journalism” when strong, colorful personalities dominated the American press.289
Newspaper editors “rallied the shock troops of party conflict,” with columns of “fire and
brimstone” rhetoric.290 Consequently, mid-nineteenth century American newspapers
often obstructed the truth, seeking to inflame the passions of their readers. The most
biting editors, known for their hyperbole, earned ardent followings.291 Prentice
recognized his keen ability to stir Journal readers’ passions, noting without remorse: “if
our shouts were more stirring and thrilling than those of our opponents, the only reason
was that we knew how to make them so.”292
Prentice sensed the shift toward the Know Nothings in Kentucky and casting his
lot with them rather than the rival Democrats, made his initial endorsement of the party
on April 17, 1855.293 The extreme nativist sentiment that characterized Prentice’s later
writings did not color either his initial endorsement or his personal life. Indeed, though
Prentice was an avowed Protestant, his wife attended the Roman Catholic seminary of
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Nazareth near Bardstown, Kentucky.294 According to Prentice’s own later account, the
Catholic Church baptized both of his sons as infants, presumably at his wife’s behest.295
Initially, Prentice’s embrace of the Know Nothings had less to do with nativism and antiCatholicism than the preservation of the Union and the non-agitation of slavery. With the
Whig Party in collapse, Prentice believed the Know Nothings offered the best hope for
saving the nation. As the editor explained:
Probably the most ominous and momentous question now agitating is that of
slavery.
This question, infinitely more than any other or all others, threatens the
Union. The crisis
is perilous, and in this crisis the American Party is the only one
that can be relied on to
save the country. . . . Nothing is to be hoped from the South
from any party in the North
except the American Party. If that party cannot save the Union, the Union is
doomed.296
In the view of Prentice and many others, the Know Nothing Party provided the
only protection from the sectional winds that threatened to blast the nation. Rather than
join their foes and potential secessionist agitators in the Democratic Party, Prentice
pressed other former Whigs to rally under the Know Nothing banner. Likewise, Prentice
urged northerners to vote the Know Nothing ticket because he hoped the party would
reign in the growing enthusiasm from the new Republican Party. Often criticized by his
detractors for his northern birth, Prentice supported slavery but believed it a “necessary
evil” that would eventually disappear.297 His “moderate” stance on slavery led Prentice to
support the Know Nothings who called for an end to sectional tensions and agitation over
slavery.
The same spring, a number of influential Kentucky Whigs also realized the
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futility of attempting to revive the party. “I think the Whig Party of the South is dissolved
and the divisions of the parties for the immediate future will be . . . Democrat,” a
Louisville Whig wrote to New York Republican William H. Seward in late March
1855.298 Two days later, Kentucky Democratic Congressman John C. Breckinridge
concurred that the Know Nothings had displaced Kentucky’s Whigs and interpreted the
change as positive for the Democrats. Whatever happened in 1855, Breckinridge
predicted, “the Whigs will be unable to resume their position in the state and we [the
Democrats] shall control it.”299
Meanwhile, the Kentucky Know Nothings continued to rack up political victories.
“Sam’s” followers won in Elizabethtown on April 5, and two days later the Know
Nothings claimed victory in Louisville by 1,400 votes, electing the mayor, city attorney,
assessor, auditor, and treasurer.300 During the Louisville contest, a “small amount of
rioting” between American Party members and Democratic supporters foreshadowed
events to come, though no deaths occurred. The Louisville Courier condemned the
violence, but assigned no blame.301 As the August gubernatorial election drew closer,
party rhetoric heated and tensions rose dramatically. Know Nothings sought support
throughout much of the state. “The Know Nothings multiply very rapidly,” noted
Reverend Thomas Cleland, a Presbyterian minister from the former Whig stronghold of
Lebanon.302
Despite the stunning local victories between January and April 1855, dissatisfied
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Know Nothings began to speak out. Following Prentice’s endorsement of the party, a
number of Kentucky Whig leaders launched a full-scale attempt to seize Know Nothing
machinery from its founders and convert the order from a nativist, anti-Catholic, and antiparty protest into a conservative Whig vehicle.303 In the process, Kentucky’s old-line
Whigs relentlessly shoved the original Know Nothing crusaders aside. The nomination of
former Whigs in place of committed nativists sparked outrage among recently added
party members. In Henry Clay’s former Ashland congressional district, where Stephen F.
J. Trabue, the longtime nativist advocate had announced himself as the Know Nothing
choice, party leaders decided to hold a convention to nominate an official candidate.304
Incumbent Congressman John C. Breckinridge had announced his intention not to seek
reelection, and former Whigs seized the opportunity to fill the Democrat’s seat.305 Trabue
had created Whig enemies during his previous run under the Native American banner,
and former Whigs contested his right to the nomination. Whigs cast Trabue aside, and
chose instead James F. Robertson of Fayette County to run as the Know Nothing Party’s
candidate.306 The choice of Robertson, closely identified with the old Whig political
machine, angered die-hard nativists in the Ashland district.307
Former Whig leaders similarly succeeded in nominating Humphrey Marshall, an
old supporter of Henry Clay, for Louisville’s congressional district. When the Know
Nothing candidate for governor, Judge William Loving, resigned from the ticket due to ill
health in April, the party’s Central Committee, now dominated by ex-Whigs, selected
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former Congressman Charles S. Morehead, nephew of a former Whig governor and the
leading contender for the Whig nomination before the party’s downfall.308 More insulting
to nativists, Morehead had twice run against Trabue as the Whig candidate for Congress.
Morehead’s recent entry into the American Party and his anti-nativist past, troubled longtime Know Nothings dubious about his motives.309
Indeed, former Whigs proved far more successful in infiltrating Know Nothing
ranks and emerging as candidates than they had been at stopping the party’s ascension.
Know Nothing publications like the Louisville Courier viewed the transformation of Old
Whigs into Know Nothing Party candidates as transparently opportunistic and voiced
their disapproval. Seeing the original aims of their party—halting of Catholic influence
and stricter naturalization laws—perverted by the ascendancy of former Whigs, “true
nativists” reevaluated their relationship with the party in the Kentucky press.310 The
Courier reacted with the most outrage. Though it expressed dismay at the nominations of
Robertson and Morehead, the paper nonetheless agreed to support the two candidates.
However, the nomination of Humphrey Marshall in the Louisville district strained the
Courier’s loyalties to a breaking point.311 Walter Haldeman, the editor of the Courier and
longtime nativist supporter, publicly refused to support Marshall’s bid for Congress, with
whom he had shared decades-long policy disagreements. Viewing Marshall’s nomination
as unreasonable, Haldeman sought to withdraw from the Know Nothing order. Rather
than allow Haldeman this courtesy, however, the order instead expelled him three weeks
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later.312
In response, the Courier launched a no holds barred attack against the tyranny of
the Know Nothing order and the betrayal of nativism by venal and corrupt politicians.313
Jilted and angry, the Courier accused Kentucky Know Nothings of contravening their
original principles, lacking a national presence, and of serving as the handmaiden of the
old Whig establishment.314 Although the Courier never removed the American Party
nominees from its masthead, the paper implored its readers to support Marshall’s
opponent, an independent Whig receiving Democratic support, and remained silent on
other Kentucky races.315 The Courier conceded by castigating ex-Whigs as “men who
have broken down the old parties to which they belonged, and who are now seeking to
advance themselves by riding into power on the popularity of the new organization.”316
Haldeman and other longtime nativists wanted no part in extending Whig cronyism.
Kentucky’s Know Nothing movement not only attracted former Whigs, but some
disenchanted Democrats as well. However, the ascendance of Marshall and Morehead led
many Democrats to question their new affiliation if it meant casting their votes for such
partisan Whigs.317 From the start of the Know Nothing Party, the Democratic press had
branded it as a Whig front organized to attract unsuspecting Democrats. The nomination
of figures such as Robertson, Marshall, and Morehead confirmed Democratic
accusations. When Whigs downplayed nativist doctrines and emphasized that the Know
Nothings represented a revival of old Whig principles, the Democratic press reminded
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voters of the party’s longtime opposition to favored Whig policies such as a national
bank, a protective tariff, and distribution of the surplus.318 As a result of Old Whigs’ entry
into the Know Nothing ranks, most Democrats withdrew from the order.319
Still, not all prominent Kentucky Whigs stampeded into the Know Nothing Party.
Know Nothingism did not simply replace (or forcibly displace) the southern Whig Party;
it also turned former Whig allies against one another. The Know Nothing Party even
drove some Whigs into an alliance with Democrats to crush a movement they
abhorred.320 Moreover, not all southern Whigs upset by the northern Whigs’ embrace of
antislavery saw Know Nothingism as their best response. Some self-proclaimed “old
Henry Clay Whigs” gravitated toward the Democrats because northern Democrats, unlike
northern Whigs contained “a reputable number of union men, who will accord to the
South their rights.”321 For the old Henry Clay supporters, protection of the Union
outranked any other issue.
One follower of Clay, Thomas B. Stevenson, a prominent Whig from Mason
County, worried that neither the Know Nothings nor the new northern Republican Party
espoused former Whig principles. As a result, he hesitantly vowed to side with the
Democrats. “I cannot possibly support either the Republican or Know Nothing platforms
or nominees,” wrote Stevenson; “the Democratic platform is bad enough in all
conscience, but the others are far worse.”322 In a list of political grievances, Stevenson
deemed the “filibusterism” of the Democratic platform “detestable,” but argued that the
318

Ibid.
Ibid.
320
Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, 934.
321
Ibid., 926.
322
Letter from Thomas B. Stevenson to Adam Beatty, July 2, 1856. Beatty-Quisenberry
Papers, Special Collections: FHS.
319

78

“sectionalism of the Republicans, menacing to the Union,” and the “assaults upon civil
and religious liberty by the Know Nothings were “still more perilous and appalling” than
the threats of their former rivals in the Democratic Party.323 A number of prominent
Kentucky Whigs echoed sentiments similar to Stevenson’s as Kentucky’s gubernatorial
election approached. Whigs such as Archibald Dixon, just finishing his term as a Whig
senator, former Lieutenant Governor H. G. Bibbs, J. R. Underwood, William Preston, and
A. C. Talbot, elected to Congress as a Whig in 1854, left their party and joined the
Democratic Party rather than associate with the Know Nothings.324 All five figures were
lifelong Whigs and had served as electors for Whig candidate Winfield Scott in 1852.325
Other disgruntled Kentucky Whigs preferred futile independence to joining a new
party. Still others angrily asserted Whiggery’s survival as if such statements could keep
the party alive. “Is the Whig Party to be dissolved or it to preserve its organizations?”
asked a Kentucky editor in 1855.326 Since “the two great parties, which have so long
divided the American people and held sway alternatively over the national administration
. . .are mutually dependent and one cannot exist without the other,” the Whig Party must
endure despite the rise of Know Nothingism.327 Thomas Stevenson likewise reiterated his
disdain of the Know Nothings and hope for a Whig revival. “Unless the Whigs
reorganize this year—and do it too even in the face of defeat—I fear the country must be
given over to sectionalism or locofocism,” he remarked.328 From Christian County,
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former Whig Thomas Wallace also expressed doubts about the capabilities of the Know
Nothing Party. Although “we have much political excitement on hand,” Wallace
concluded that the “remedy of the American Party is inadequate to the emergency.” “It
will not cure the patient now,” he insisted, “it is too weak.”329
Despite trepidation of some wary Whigs, the Know Nothing movement continued
to move ahead as the August election approached. The press played a central role in the
campaign, with the Know Nothing Journal and the Democratic Louisville Times taking
center stage. The ardently pro-slavery Times charged that the Know Nothing issues of
nativism and anti-Catholicism served as a cover for antislavery and justified the “lowest
depths of servile toadyism to the North, besmeared with abolitionist slime.”330 It also
attacked Prentice’s Connecticut roots and charged him with secret antislavery aims. The
Journal responded by emphasizing Know Nothing’s anti-Catholic stance to an
unprecedented degree.331 Prentice highlighted the growth of Catholicism and denounced
the religion as “altogether antagonistic to the ideas of civil and religious freedom upon
which the future of our republican government is based.” He further warned that “the
safety of our free institutions, thus openly despised, requires that we should guard against
its wily machinations.”332 Charging Catholics as antagonistic toward American
democracy, Prentice labeled them “the most dangerous foes of religious liberty” who
remained “bound to crush it . . . obligated by their creed to annihilate religious liberty
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wherever they found it.”333 Depicting Know Nothings as patriots, Prentice compared the
war against Roman Catholicism to the American Revolution, and called upon “every
freeman, every true lover of his country to aid [the American Party] in this resistance
against foreign aggression.”334
On Independence Day 1855, Prentice issued a dramatic call to patriotic action,
writing, “Our noble ancestors of three generations ago fought for seven long years to
deliver our country from foreign domination, and now we are engaged in a mighty
struggle to deliver it from the fearful peril of a foreign domination more insidious, more
formidable, and infinitely more degrading.”335 Prentice charged that a failure to win the
struggle against Catholicism would lead to the certain destruction of American
democratic principles.336 Employing heightened rhetoric to warn his readers, Prentice
charged that Catholics did not vote as American citizens, but rather “as a member of the
Catholic Church, as a servant and agent of the Pope of Rome, as an employee of the
Roman Church and its head to see the maintenance of their interests and their power in
the administration of the government of the United States.”337 Following the anti-Catholic
literature of the era, Prentice interpreted the continuing influx of Catholic immigrants as
evidence of a papal conspiracy to infiltrate America.338 In the months preceding the
August election, Prentice filled the Journal’s pages with descriptions of the Catholic
threat, warning:
The indefatigable perseverance, with which Rome works out her dark schemes in
333
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furtherance of Papal supremacy, indicates, with almost unquestionable certainty,
that to the secret influence of that mysterious power that sits enthroned in Rome,
from whence it sends its mandates to willing subjects scattered all over the world,
we must refer this unity of political actions by foreigners in this country. 339
Linking the fear of Romanism with the threat of immigration, Prentice warned
that naturalized residents would “trample upon all laws, human and divine, to substitute
lustful licentiousness for constitutional liberty, and mob violence for peace and order.”340
Seeking to divert attention from the slavery issue, Prentice stressed the most common
Know Nothing theme: the need to prevent illegal foreign voting by checking
naturalization papers at the polls.341 As Prentice cautioned his readers:
It behooves the American Party to be ever active and vigilant. The enemies of the
country
have combined against it. Foreignism, Romanism, Abolitionism, and all the other
dangerous isms, imported from the monarchical atmosphere and soil of Europe,
have seized upon the old Democratic Party and driven nearly all good and true
men from its ranks. . . . At the ballot box we shall overwhelm this ‘combination of
factions,’ which, as if ‘stealing the livery of Heaven to serve the Devil in,’ has
assumed the name of the Democratic Party for purposes hostile to the best
interests of the country and dangerous to its most cherished institutions.342
In response to Prentice’s charges against the Democratic Party, the Louisville
Times blasted the Journal’s editor as “an impotent old biped” and a “press hyena . . . who
has outraged humanity from the moment of birth.”343 The Times urged all good
Kentuckians to halt the Know Nothings’ “onward march of treason” against the nation’s
institutions and go to the polls with an assurance that Know Nothings could not stop
intrepid voters from casting a ballot. “A bully is always a poltroon,” noted the Times. It
also reissued the claim that Prentice and the Know Nothings utilized nativist rhetoric to
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hide their true abolitionist intention of destroying the South’s “undisturbed enjoyment of
her peculiar institutions.”344
Undeterred, the Journal continued to issue its anti-Catholic message, firing back
against the Louisville Times and urging Know Nothing supporters to dominate the polls
and “rally to put down an organization of Jesuit bishops, priests, and other Papists.”345
With tensions running high, one Kentucky voter noted “great excitement such as was
never perhaps known here.” Much of the commotion “centered in questions of allegiance
to the Pope and the extension of the time required for naturalization.” The contest was
made more volatile, the voter added, by the fact that “the Democrats have the foreigners
on their side.” This Know Nothing voter also conceded that “the bringing of religion into
politics will doubtless engender great excitement and bitterness of feeling in the
country—People seem to forget that there is a God or a hereafter.”346
Threats and fears of violence on both sides continued as the August election
approached. Although Prentice denied that his editorials called for violence, he insisted
“upon the protection of the polls and of all who wish to go to them from the danger of
mob violence.” He added, “we need not and we will not hesitate to speak of the hatred
and the insane rage . . . in the minds of the mass of Germans and Irish in this city against
the American Party.”347 In response to the Know Nothings, a German-led, anti-nativist
group known as the “Sag Nicts” or “Say Nothings” formed, drawing the particular ire of
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the Louisville Journal.348 Denouncing Sag Nicts as plotters against the republic, Prentice
advised its members and other foreign-born voters to keep their distance from the
polls.349 On May 4, the Journal warned of two thousand Sag Nicht members in Louisville
and then exclaimed:
Why, bless you, reader, Know-Nothingism is a thundering proclamation from the
housetops in comparison with this Sag-Nichtism, this Say-Nothingism, this dumb
foreignism, which like the ‘pestilence that walketh in darkness,’ is going to and
fro among us in invisible coat, jacket, and breeches.350
In the months that followed, Prentice continued to warn Know Nothing readers of the
threat posed by Sag Nicts. He reported a false account of Louisville’s William O’Brien,
“said to be a very violent Sag Nicht bully,” and accused O’Brien and his brother of
attacking an opponent and shooting a passerby. Prentice scorned their behavior while
attributing their actions to the entire group, calling it “a sample of the violence
contemplated by the bullies of the Sag Nicht party.”351 While the attention-grabbing story
made the Journal’s front page, a subsequent retraction only warranted three lines hidden
on the second.352
Despite the falseness of the O’Brien story, Prentice continued to publish
fabricated stories of anti-Know Nothing agitation. In a later issue, Prentice claimed a
respectable Louisville resident heard of Democratic plots to arm Louisville’s German and
Irish citizens with knives and pistols on Election Day.353 Playing into these heightened
fears, Prentice republished an article from a Mississippi newspaper in which the IrishWilliam C. Mallalieu, “George D. Prentice: A Reappraisal Reappraised,” The Register
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Protestant editor warned against the invading Catholics: “There is a danger—for God’s
sake protect yourselves while you can. I knew them, where they burned Bibles, they
murdered heretics, they set the law of the land at defiance, and would obey no law but the
law of the Church.”354 Prentice added that he hoped Louisville’s immigrant voters would
“by all means leave their deadly weapons home” on Election Day. But he then described
another anti-Know Nothing “bully” who “talked with very great excitement about pistols
and bowie-knives and about men’s wading in blood,” and a follower who proclaimed,
“the German and the Irish shall vote, even at the cost of a fight half a mile long.” The
Journal failed to name either supposed anti-Know Nothing instigator.355
As Election Day grew nearer, Louisville’s Democrats offered a number of
proposals to preserve the peace. Democrats also hoped such measures would protect their
interests and ensure their party’s voters could make it to the polls unobstructed.356 The
proposals requested the city open new polls to make voting quicker, set up a two party
poll-watching group, and establish two sets of election officers stationed in each ward.357
Though a bipartisan peacekeeping group might have approved such measures, no such
institution existed. The new state constitution of 1850 lacked any provision for selecting
election officials from the major parties.358 Consequently, because the American Party
controlled the Jefferson County court offices, all election officials were ardent party
members. Know Nothings also dominated the Louisville city council. Moreover, the
incumbent Attorney General James Harlan, also a Know Nothing, refused to grant
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additional polling places to the German and Irish inhabited wards.359 While the Know
Nothings remained confident they would carry the central part of the city, they feared a
large Democratic vote from the German and Irish wards to the east and west.360
Increasing the number of polling places in these districts would only hurt Know Nothing
chances of victory. At the same time, the 1850 state constitution had reduced the number
of days voters could cast their ballots from three to one. Despite the decreased time for
voting, the city failed to open any new polling places.361
Just five days before the election, the Know Nothings organized two torch-light
processions in Louisville. Alluding to the party’s clandestine nature, Prentice announced
the procession scheduled for Saturday, August 4, noting, “we think the members of the
Order will prove upon this occasion that they are entirely willing not only to come boldly
before the public but to furnish the world an abundance of light to see them by.”362 Know
Nothing supporters paraded forcefully through Louisville’s streets, intoxicated with
hopes of an approaching electoral victory. The Friday before the election, Prentice
predicted a bleak outcome if Democrats managed to win the election:
The bitterness of the foreign element would burst forth in double volume, and the
Catholics, now crouching with subdued but rankling venom, awaiting our
subjugation by their political allies, would spring upon us with the fury of the
tiger. Their breasts are now swelling with the hope of revenge, and our defeat
would end in our political destruction, and probably our religious ruin.363
The heated rhetoric, charged partisan supporters, heightened rumors, and limited polling
locations promised a volatile Election Day.
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August 6, 1855: Bloody Monday
On the morning of August 6, 1855, the Louisville Journal issued one final call for fellow
nativists to rally under the Know Nothing banner. Prentice urged voters “to put down an
organization of Jesuit Bishops, Priests, and other Papists . . . who aim by secret oaths and
horrid perjuries and midnight plotting to sap the foundation of our political edifices!”364
Prentice’s provocative words had the power to persuade sympathetic readers that
Catholic foreigners under the leaderships of their priests plotted against the American
voters.365
The Democratic Party feared that Know Nothings would attempt to suppress
Democratic votes. On Election Day, their fears became a reality. At midnight, the
“executive committees” of the American Party and a number of police officers, all Know
Nothing supporters, assumed control of the polling locations before voting began.366 In
addition to scattered police officers, a number of “party toughs” arrived and stationed
themselves at the doors of the polls with instructions to deny entrance to anyone not
showing the “sign,” a yellow ticket indicating a Know Nothing ballot.367 When the polls
opened at 6:00 a.m., large crowds waited, stationed at entrances to ward off Democratic
voters. Simultaneously, Know Nothings opened the side and back doors of polling places
for the easy entry of fellow party members.368 Democrats maintained that Know Nothing
“toughs” turned away the first wave of foreign-born citizens attempting to vote.369
Ongoing Know Nothing harassment blocked Democratic access to the polls and ensured
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that most of the actual voting took place before noon.370
The strong-arm tactics of Know Nothing intimidators incensed foreign-born
voters and anger rose steadily as the morning continued. Though later reports claimed the
Know Nothing Party toughs stabbed two opponents in the early hours, no deaths resulted
in this initial altercation.371 According to most accounts, Know Nothing member George
Berg became the first casualty of Bloody Monday around 9:00 a.m., when a group of
angry Irishmen accosted Berg and beat him to death after Know Nothings obstructed
their access to the polls.372 After noon, mobs of American Party supporters roamed the
streets of Louisville looking for foreigners or Catholics, seeking vengeance for Berg’s
death.373 As the growing mob of Know Nothing supporters marched into the German
district, defensive gunshots rang out from German-owned houses. Once the shooting
began, Know Nothings mobs became uncontrollable.374
The increasing anti-Catholic hysteria worried Bishop Martin John Spalding, who
suspected that Know Nothings would target Church property. As a result, Bishop
Spalding passed the keys of the Cathedral of the Assumption to Louisville’s Mayor John
Barbee, charging him with the building’s safety. Instead, the mob marched to St. Martin’s
Church on Shelby Street after rumors spread that Catholics had stored arms in the
church’s basement.375 Though a Know Nothing official, Mayor Barbee attempted to quell
the mob’s anger and prove the rumors untrue. Determined to stop further violence,
Barbee quickly entered the edifice and thoroughly searched it. Finding no arms, Barbee
Hutcheon, “The Louisville Riots of August 1855,” 130.
Ibid., 130-131.
372
Ibid., 131.
373
Ibid.
374
Ibid.
375
Ibid.
370
371

88

informed the mob and advised his fellow Know Nothings to disperse.
Disregarding Barbee, the Know Nothing crowd instead joined a marching group
of supporters, comprised of about fifty armed men shouldering muskets and bayonets and
pulling a cannon.376 By approximately 3:00 p.m., the group assembled outside
Armbruster’s Brewery after an employee reportedly fired at the crowd. The mob raided
the facility, attacked employees, consumed large quantities of beer, and then set the
building aflame. The altercation in or around the facility led to the deaths of ten people,
most of them Germans who attempted to stop the destruction.377 Watching from his office
window, prominent Louisvillian James Speed noted that he “saw many men, Irish and
German, beaten in the courthouse yard. . . . It was not fighting man to man, but as many
as could all upon a single Irish or German and beat him with sticks or short clubs.”378 In
addition, the mob also attacked the adjacent Green Street Brewery, though they failed to
destroy it.
For the remainder of the day, violence erupted in Louisville’s Irish district or First
Ward. After reports that two Irishmen had killed Theodore Rhodes while he walked
through the street, he mob sought vengeance.379 A number of Irish residents fired from
houses located along “Quinn’s Row,” in an attempt to stop the invaders from wreaking
havoc upon their district. Patrick Quinn, a wealthy Irish land developer, owned the row of
houses that he let out to tenants.380 After tenants fired on the invading Know Nothings,
the group retaliated by setting fire to the whole row, burning at least twenty houses and
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killing several more people. The crowd also attacked anyone who attempted to put out
the flames. The mob seriously beat one Irish resident, and reportedly threatened to
decapitate him. Unable to find an ax, members of the mob instead stabbed him with a
pitchfork.381 Quinn bravely confronted the mob, offering his money in exchange for the
protection of his property. But the mob refused Quinn’s offer, killed him, and took the
money.382 When Louisville’s fire department arrived, Know Nothings threatened to stop
the men forcibly if they attempted to extinguish the flames.383 The burning of and
carnage at Quinn’s Row proved the most destructive of the riots. Thereafter, the mob
began to break ranks although several small fires continued throughout the night. The last
incident of mob violence, Know Nothings attempted to burn the offices of two opposition
newspapers, the Louisville Times and the Louisville Democrat. The Know Nothingcontrolled police, however, unwilling to stop the shootings and burning of private
property in Irish and German neighborhoods, interceded to protect the two newspapers
buildings.384
In the wake of the violence, a number of grisly stories surfaced. During the chaos,
one source reported, the mob pulled an old German man from his bed and shot him.
Know Nothing thugs reportedly beat another man unconscious, throwing him down a
stairwell to his death. Asked if he saw anyone in the torched buildings, one Know
Nothing mob leader replied, “Not many whites, just Irish.”385 In the pandemonium of
Bloody Monday, an estimated five hundred rioters left large areas of Louisville in ruins.
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Though the exact number of people killed during the riots remains unknown, estimates
have ranged up to a hundred. The most commonly cited number is twenty-two deaths,
with the foreign-born amounting to two-thirds of the deaths.386 One of the victims also
included a Catholic priest, stoned by the mob as he assisted a dying parishioner.387
The day following the election, Mayor Barbee denounced the violence and made
preparations to squelch further outbreaks. Although rumors of an Irishman injuring a
Know Nothing briefly threatened renewed trouble, no additional mobbing ensued.388 The
carnage and destruction appalled the vast majority of observers. However, few failed to
interpret the tragedy according to their opinion of foreigners or Know Nothings.
American Party apologists pointed to the incident as another example of the problems
created by foreign voters.389 Maintaining that he played no role in inciting the violence,
Prentice assured readers of the Louisville Journal that “every act of bloodshed was begun
by foreigners.”390 In contrast, the Democratic press argued that the violence resulted from
heated Know Nothing rhetoric. Private opinions about the violence followed the same
pattern, with political affiliation dictating who the individuals blamed for the violence.
Stoddard Johnston, a future historian of Louisville, lamented in his journal that
“Kentucky has been the scene of such villainous, cowardly proceedings.” A Democratic
Party supporter, he attributed the blame to the “Know Nothings instigated by their leaders
and lodges.”391 Diarist L. C. Porter, a Know Nothing sympathizer, decried Bloody
Monday as “the most painful and disgraceful tragedy that happened in the history of our
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national existence.” He spread responsibility widely, citing “the pleading politicians . . .
the passions of men . . . incited by . . . partisan editors,” but he especially censured
“foreigners who, naturally slavish and bloodthirsty, were easily induced to resort to acts
of violence.”392
Writing in the aftermath of the riots, J. H. Asbaugh expressed dismay at the
conflicting accounts in the press. Bloody Monday, Asbaugh asserted, stood as “a terrible
and horrible affair and attaches great blame somewhere but of course I cannot tell who
are the most culpable parties when the papers . . . give such contradictory versions.”393
Asbaugh trusted that American Party members “were not the aggressors in the awful and
bloody excitement which all good citizens must deeply and seriously deplore and
condemn.”394 Reflecting American Party principles, Asbaugh employed unionist rhetoric
in the aftermath of the violence. He “hoped the American Party may . . . prove in all
coming time worthy of its name” against threats of agitation, adding:
Let us hope also that if the fell spirit of disunion shall ever triumph over devoted
patriotism and the Sons of Liberty shall ever go down amid the terrible waves of
anarchy
. . . God may shine upon the gallant sons of old Kentucky standing forth
ready die in defense of the Union.395
In the wake of the violence in Louisville, mob activities involving Know
Nothings exploded throughout the nation. In Memphis, the Know Nothing mayor called
out the militia because he anticipated rioters from St. Louis.396 Rumors of German
tampering with ballot boxes prompted an election riot in Cincinnati, and days before
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Mobile’s 1855 elections nativists coupled speeches against immigrant vote fraud with
raids on Irish neighborhoods.397 Far west in San Francisco, a self-styled Know Nothing
Vigilance Committee murdered five men suspected of corrupting elections.398 Violence
accompanied elections involving Know Nothings in part because of the party’s success in
attracting first-time voters to the polls.399 New voters, unfamiliar with the routines of
elections, believed American Party claims that Democrats stole elections with unqualified
immigrant voters.400 The conviction that Democratic officials connived with immigrants
to cheat their way into office spurred the natural outbursts of Know Nothing violence
throughout 1855.401
Despite the widespread outrage over the violence, city officials did little to redress
tensions in the aftermath of Bloody Monday. The committee appointed to investigate the
riots—dominated by Know Nothings—predictably blamed immigrants “in every
instance.”402 Referring to Quinn’s Row as a “Jesuit resort” and the dead as “priest ridden
foreign hirelings,” the committee offered little solace to the victims of Bloody Monday’s
violence.403 The committee ultimately compensated forty-one people for the vast damage,
but the victims received only small sums, hardly adequate compensation for their
losses.404 A number of prominent citizens, including James Speed and William Preston,
petitioned the city council and implored that they fully repay victims for the damages
they suffered. The city council unanimously refused, stating that “neither favor nor
397
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encouragement should be given to those whose conduct tends to create mobs.”405 In
response, hundreds of Louisville’s Catholic immigrants fled the city, seeking safety
farther west in cities such as St. Louis. As Census records indicate, the violence of
Bloody Monday deterred additional Catholic immigrants from settling in Louisville for
some years.406
Kentucky’s Know Nothing Party After Bloody Monday
In the elections of Bloody Monday, the Know Nothing Party carried Kentucky and the
city of Louisville by a landslide.407 Compared to the 1852 presidential election, the
Democrats failed to win new support with most Whig-supporting counties supported the
American Party.408 Although Know Nothings won handily in most former Whig
strongholds, they failed to make definite inroads into Democratic counties, including far
eastern Kentucky and the western Jackson Purchase.409 Know Nothings attributed failure
in the eastern region to neglect and party leaders promised that “Sam will have visited
and fully talked with the hardy mountaineers at their homes and fire sides” before the
next election.410 For months after the balloting, Bloody Monday remained a subject of
heated debate, particularly among Democrats who charged that Know Nothing violence
deterred the bulk of Louisville Democrats from reaching the polls. Democrats in the state
legislature also attempted to place responsibility for the riots on their opponents, though
Know Nothing legislators replied that “Democratic toughs” who had unwittingly shot at
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“peaceful citizens” provoked the violence.411
Despite the riots, Kentucky’s Know Nothings continued to enjoy electoral
success. A few weeks after Bloody Monday, Know Nothings held a quarterly meeting in
Louisville and elected Edward B. Bartlett of Covington, a former Democrat and clerk of
the Kenton County circuit court, president of the party’s state council.412 Successfully
electing Charles S. Morehead in the gubernatorial race, Know Nothings were confident
that their party had begun a long reign over state politics. Know Nothings also remained
optimistic about their national prospects in 1855, with the party winning additional statewide races in New York, California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Maryland, Delaware, and Louisiana.413
During the 1856 session of the Kentucky legislature, Know Nothings and
Democrats found little to agree upon. The new legislature contained fifty-one Know
Nothings and thirty-four Democrats and began in disagreement. Democrats protested that
their numbers had been reduced as a result of gerrymandering by the previous legislature.
A “true” or “fair” election, Democrats claimed, would have given them fifty-five seats to
the Know Nothings’ forty-four.414 In the judicial districts, which Democrats rightly
claimed were gerrymandered, the Know Nothings also carried a majority of the offices.
In the meantime, the American Party enjoyed victories in municipal elections in
Henderson and Louisville. In a special message in his annual message to the Kentucky
legislature the following year, Governor Morehead strongly opposed an increase in
banking facilities, because of the state’s already inflated currency. True to his word,
411
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Morehead successfully vetoed a few banking bills.415 On one issue, however, the two
parties agreed: a three cent school tax carried by a 5 to 1 ratio.416
The year 1856 also brought another presidential election year. With President
Franklin Pierce stepping down, both Know Nothings and northern Republicans hoped to
bring an end to Democratic Party rule. Know Nothing delegates assembled for their
national nominating convention in Philadelphia on February 22, 1856, seeking to
nationalize the party by adopting a neutral policy toward slavery. At the outset, Kentucky
delegates promoted their own candidate for the presidency, state Know Nothing leader
Garrett Davis, but he fared poorly with only twelve votes from Massachusetts, Virginia,
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky.417 As the balloting progressed, many Kentucky
delegates switched their vote to former President Millard Fillmore of New York, who
won the nomination with Andrew Donelson of Tennessee as his running mate. However
satisfied the Know Nothings were with their ticket, a lack of unanimity on the slavery
issue cast a shadow over the convention. Able to agree on tightening naturalization laws
and fighting the “aggressive policy and corrupting tendencies” of Roman Catholicism,
the delegates split over the issue of slavery.418 Attempts to find common ground on
slavery and nationalize the campaign caused an implosion. Northern delegates in
particular rejected a neutral stance on slavery. In response, one Virginia delegate declared
all northern delegates abolitionists, the party a failure, and called for the convention’s
end.419 Though he exaggerated, many anti-abolitionist northern conservatives opposed
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abolition, every attempt to finesse the slavery issue backfired. The convention adopted a
rambling new plank that endorsed popular sovereignty in the territories, but it proved so
confusing that one delegate remarked the election would pass before the voters figured
out what it meant.420 Convinced of their doom in the North with a platform embracing
popular sovereignty and wary of Fillmore, northern malcontents withdrew from the party
in droves.
The new Republican Party had no such difficulties. The Republican Convention,
held in New York City in June, nominated John C. Frémont of California and espoused a
platform of “Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men,” designed to appeal to northern voters in
opposition to slavery’s western expansion. The Democrats, meeting in Cincinnati,
nominated James Buchanan of Pennsylvania as their presidential candidate and
Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge as his running mate. The Democratic Party platform
advocated “squatter sovereignty,” condemned the Know Nothings, and promised asylum
to immigrants.421
With the former Whig Fillmore as their nominee, the Know Nothings focused on
their patriotic appeal as defenders of the Union, while promoting a vague platform
designed to attract nativists, anti-Catholics, and both proslavery and antislavery former
Whigs.422 The Old Whigs who now controlled the party resolved that “without adopting
or referring to the peculiar principles of the party which has already selected Millard
Fillmore as their candidate, we look to him as a well-tried and faithful friend of the
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Constitution and the Union.”423 Despite Know Nothing’s efforts to pacify regional
differences, however, former southern Whigs doubted Fillmore’s chances of winning. A
vote for him, they wagered, translated into a vote for radical Republicans led by Frémont.
Consequently, doubtful southerners abandoned Fillmore and the Know Nothing ticket,
siding instead with the Democrats.424
In Kentucky, Democrats proved successful by employing the unionist appeals of
the old Whig playbook. Arguing that a Republican victory would mean disunion,
Democrats urged voters to back Buchanan in order to avert sectional conflict. Democrats
identified preservation of the Union with southern rights, and thus interpreted a Buchanan
triumph as proof of Unionism’s strength in Kentucky.425 The remaining Kentucky Know
Nothings also opposed the election of a Republican president, but they did not believe a
Frémont victory justified disunion.426 Such voters adhered to the Whig idea that the
Union formed the best defense of southern rights.
Other former Whigs joined the Democratic ranks because of their dislike of the
Know Nothing’s nativist rhetoric. Former Whig Thomas B. Stevenson made his
objections to the American Party clear, despite their choice of Fillmore as party leader.
“Of Mr. Fillmore . . . I retain a respectful opinion,” wrote Stevenson, “but his party and
its principles, I think the worst and most pernicious with which the country has even been
cursed.”427 “The Know Nothings are literal heathens,” continued Stevenson, “they know
not the rules of Christianity or republicanism. Instead of love and fraternity, they teach
423
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hatred and hostility. They seek to force the foreign born to remain aliens.”428 He closed
his letter to former fellow Whig Adam Beatty by noting, “All [of the Know Nothing
platform] is anti-Christian, anti-republican, and, practically, extremely foolish.”429 As a
result, Stevenson vowed to vote for Buchanan in November.
The split in the Know Nothing Party extended to the highest levels of Old Whig
leadership. Kentucky’s U.S. Senator John J. Crittenden canvassed for Fillmore. In
contrast, a number of old-line Whigs such as James B. Clay (son of Henry Clay) and
William Preston joined ranks with Buchanan supporters.430 Despite the fractures,
American Party demonstrations and ratification meetings occurred throughout the state.
The Journal’s George Prentice continued to trumpet the Know Nothing cause, while
Roger Hanson, a prominent Know Nothing elector, canvassed the state, encouraging
voters to stick with the Know Nothing ticket.431 As the campaign continued, John C.
Breckinridge castigated Know Nothing supporters and looked optimistically to the
possibility of a Democratic triumph. “The very choicest spirits of the old parties now
stand together,” he noted, “and the Know Nothing Party . . . is literally composed of the
fag ends of other organizations.”432 Breckinridge and other Democrats saw little future
for the American Party, noting “it may continue for a little while as a disturbing element
to certain localities, but its pretentions as a national party have already fallen into
common contempt.”433
In preparation for Election Day, Louisville officials worked to prevent a repeat of
428
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the previous August. Mayor Barbee called on Bishop Spalding to use his influence and
encourage parishioners to help maintain law and order.434 Complying with the mayor’s
request, Spalding issued a statement to Louisville’s Catholic population, imploring them
to curb undue excitement:
While it is clearly not our province to interfere with the political discussions of
the day, it is surely competent for us, under present circumstances earnestly to
exhort all our fellow citizens to claim nothing which the laws do not secure to
them, to exercise even their undoubted civil rights with due forbearance, and
moderation, scrupulously respecting the feelings and rights of others, and in
general, to exhibit themselves as good citizens by a strict compliance with all the
requirements of the law.435
In Kentucky, Election Day 1856 transpired without the violence that marred the
previous year. Democrats were jubilant as the results revealed that their party had carried
the state for the first time since Andrew Jackson’s reelection twenty-eight years earlier.436
Though not a landslide by any measure, the final count in Kentucky gave the Know
Nothings 67,416 and the Democrats 74,642.437 In Jefferson County, in contrast, Know
Nothings retained their advantage, with Fillmore receiving 4,982 votes to Buchanan’s
2,972.438 But, Fillmore’s national showing proved disastrous as he carried only Maryland
in the Electoral College, compared to Buchanan’s nineteen states and Frémont’s eleven
northern states. Although he won only 45 percent of the popular vote, Buchanan took the
entire South, save Maryland, as well as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and
California. Winning just 871,731 national votes (or 21.6 percent), Fillmore ran a half
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million votes behind Winfield Scott’s total four years earlier.439 Despite losing the state,
Fillmore accrued his fourth highest percentage of votes in Kentucky (47.5 percent) after
Maryland (54.6 percent), Louisiana (48.3 percent), and Tennessee (47.8 percent).440
As in the previous three presidential election cycles, nativists accused immigrants
and Democrats of voter fraud. The editor of the Covington Journal believed that Fillmore
could have won the state. His clear loss, the editor continued, clearly demonstrated the
necessity of stronger naturalization laws “unless [Know Nothings] are prepared to ground
arms and submit everything to the tender mercies of freshly landed foreigners, and their
desperate leaders.”441 Bishop Spalding responded that “Protestant ministers became
generally strong political partisans” during elections, making “their pulpits resound with
impassioned political harangues, often verging on the weapon of bitter denouncement of
the Catholic Church and Catholics as enemies of free institutions, in an effort to
disfranchise United States citizens.”442
In the Senate, John B. Thompson and John Crittenden continued to represent
Kentucky. Thompson, an old-line Whig, stated that he once thought of joining the
American Party, but he objected to its proscription of Catholics. Instead, he advocated
curbing the influence of foreigners whose “whole influence is anti-Southern.”443 An
active sponsor of the Know Nothing Party, Crittenden took exception to Illinois Senator
Stephen Douglas’s remark that Know Nothingism and abolitionism were identical.
Crittenden argued that as long as the foreign-born population could be assimilated by the
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native-born population, they posed no threat. However, once immigrants became a
distinct element in the voting population, they became dangerous.444
Fillmore’s dismal national performance strained and demoralized Kentucky’s
Know Nothing ranks. Some members demanded a thorough reorganization of the state
party, the state council, meeting on January 21, 1857, offered no changes to their
platform.445 Undaunted by their party’s national failure, local councils in Kentucky held
frequent meetings throughout the spring. Disputes between the Know Nothing and
Democratic press also continued unabated. For example, the Frankfort Commonwealth
and Somerset Gazette refuted Democratic charges of abolition and claimed that the
American Party included more slaveholders within its ranks.446 The assessor’s books in
Franklin County, Know Nothings argued, revealed that prominent American Party
members owned 1,797 slaves while wealthy Democrats owned only 886 slaves. In
Pulaski County to the south, prominent American Party supporters owned 1,017 slaves
while Democratic Party adherents owned just 204.447 The Know Nothing press utilized
these numbers to label Democrats the true abolitionists in the state. This debate reflected
changing political priorities in the state, especially the rising importance of the slavery
question. As the decade proceeded, the issue of slavery and Union continued to eclipse
Catholicism and naturalization.
Meeting in May 1857, Kentucky’s Know Nothing Party nominated a state ticket
and attempted to broaden their base, passing a resolution that declared all who
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sympathized with their cause full American Party members.448 In the 1857 state elections,
the party’s support declined, but Know Nothings still secured a number of victories over
their Democratic opponents. The election gave the American Party twenty of the thirtyeight seats in Kentucky’s Senate, and thirty-nine of ninety-seven seats in the state House
of Representatives. In the race for state treasurer, the Democrat J. H. Garrad defeated
Know Nothing T. L. Jones with a majority of twelve thousand votes out of one hundred
and eighteen thousand cast.449 In addition, only two of ten American Party candidates, W.
L. Underwood in the Third District and Humphrey Marshall in the Seventh District,
proved successful in their races for congressional seats. Know Nothings attributed their
losses to the political cheating of Democrats who imported alien voters and offered large
sums of cash for additional votes in the Ashland District.450
In early 1858, the American Party State Convention assembled in Louisville,
attracting three hundred delegates. Attendees elected a new executive committee and
gave them wide powers to oversee the political interests of the party. They also cast votes
for nominees for a number of local offices.451 Surveying the defeats of the previous year,
delegates placed direct appeals to Unionism at the forefront of the resolutions they
passed. They insisted on the maintenance of the Union, respect for the rights of states,
continued separation of church and state, freedom of conscience, cessation of sectional
agitation, amendment of the naturalization laws to exclude paupers and criminals, equal
distribution of the proceeds from the sale of federal lands, and loyal acceptance and
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support of decisions of the Supreme Court.452 The Court’s controversial Dred Scott
decision of the previous year excluding all African Americans from citizenship and
endorsing slavery’s spread into the western territories, caused a firestorm of indignation
in the North. In contrast, Kentucky Know Nothings sought sectional conciliation, still a
proslavery stance, calling on Americans to honor Supreme Court decisions and end
agitation over slavery’s expansion.
Know Nothings also castigated the extreme proslavery position on Kansas’s
Lecompton Constitution. A proslavery minority had drafted a new constitution for the
territory that called for its entry into the Union as a slave state. The proposed constitution
proved highly controversial. Southern and some northern Democrats embraced the
Lecompton Constitution, while Know Nothings and all northern Republicans firmly
opposed the measure. The clear manipulation of the issue by Democrats asserting slavery
into a territory in which the majority opposed it annoyed many in American Party circles.
Distancing themselves from the Democrats, Kentucky Know Nothings praised
Crittenden, Marshall, and Underwood for rejecting the Lecompton Constitution, insisting
the best defense of southern rights was a “stand for unsullied Unionist principles.”453
Kentucky Know Nothings objected to Democratic efforts to bring Kansas into the union
as a slave state. The Frankfort Commonwealth blasted the Lecompton Constitution as
unacceptable, because it represented the wishes of a minority of Kansas voters.454 As
sectional tensions increased, Kentucky Know Nothings emphasized the necessity of the
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Union, while accusing their opponents of threatening to destroy it.455
American leaders also pondered the possibility of a new political coalition. The
defeats of the previous two years convinced many that the Know Nothing Party would
not last long.456 Supporters hoped a new national coalition based on Unionism and
opposition to Lecompton, and excluding the radical Free Soil element within the
Republican Party, could defeat Democrats at the state level in 1859 and the national level
in 1860.457 Thomas Clay argued that his late father would support such a party. Other
advocates of a new party argued that Kentuckians would surely support a Unionist
coalition, noting that “Kentucky mothers teach their sons that love of country is a duty
paramount of earthly obligation.”458 As the 1858 campaign took shape, American Party
members worked to build a united anti-Democratic coalition. Kentucky Democrats
responded by blasting Know Nothings as Republicans in disguise. Labeling them
“abolitionists” and “Black Republicans,” Democrats charged that the American Party
actually undermined southern rights.459 Countering Democratic accusations in the
Louisville Journal, George Prentice argued that Republicans joined the American
position, not the other way around. American Party supporters added that Democratic
attacks revealed that the party lacked any defense for Lecompton.460
Meanwhile, the once central issue of immigration faded into the background.
Dropped to the party platform’s eighth plank in 1858, Kentucky Know Nothings
nonetheless continued to assert the need for stricter naturalization and voting laws:
455
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The right of suffrage in the States, and Territories, should be restricted to
CITIZENS of the United States, and the proposition of the Democrats, to enable
aliens to participate in the formation of State Constitutions, is a gross perversion
of principle, and the best evidence that time and events have added to the reasons
that first induced the organization of the American Party.461
Election Day, in early August 1858, passed off peaceably. Several Kentucky cities
favored the Know Nothings, but the overall results revealed the party’s waning strengths.
The Democratic Party obtained a majority of nearly one thousand and four hundred votes
in seven congressional districts, while the Americans managed a majority of slightly
more than five hundred votes in only three districts.462 Democrats proudly asserted that
Know Nothing principles no longer appealed to Kentucky voters and that the war upon
Catholics and naturalized citizens had ceased. The Democratic Kentucky Statesman
proudly asserted that “the order claims no national existence, and is hopelessly prostrate
in the state. In a word, Know Nothingism is defunct, intense Americanism an obsolete
idea.”463 The paper celebrated the demise of nativist politics, announcing:
The principles of the late American Order are not at issue in Kentucky. The Know
Nothing leaders no longer advocate any of the distinctive tenets to which the
secret brotherhood once swore fealty. They have raised a new issue—one of
general, indefinite opposition to [the Democratic Party], without specification and
upon it now go before the people. This is the sole issue with our people. The
proposition to ‘consolidate the opposition’ has been made and agreed to by the
organs and leaders.464
With the following year’s election, Kentucky Know Nothings dropped their
nativist identity.465 Abandoning the Know Nothing or American Party banner, former
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advocates instead called themselves the “Opposition Party.”466 Party leaders hoped to
start anew, gathering all factions opposed to the Democrats, including voters previously
opposed to the Know Nothing cause. At the Opposition Party’s state convention in
Louisville, prominent delegates included most of the former leading Whig and American
Party members. Robert Letcher, former Whig governor of Kentucky, presided over the
assembly that included prominent former Know Nothings such as Charles Morehead,
James Harlan, Garrett Davis, and John Barbee.467 But the new Opposition Party removed
nativist principles from its platform, instead stressing the evils of the Democratic Party,
most notably their agitation of the Union. The platform failed, however, to enunciate a
distinctive policy other than preservation of the Union and promising peace to the nation
on the slavery question.468
Even George Prentice, a leading voice in the Opposition Party just as he had been
for the Know Nothings, ceased extolling nativist rhetoric and returned to his positions of
the early 1850s. As a Catholic editor of Louisville’s Guardian newspaper proclaimed,
“these bug-bears of a day had lost their influence to create fear, and the editor knew it.”469
Rather, the new Opposition movement invited all but “disunionists and abolitionists” to
join the coalition against their Democratic opponents.470
During the 1859 gubernatorial campaign, protection of slavery in the territories
dominated the contest between Democrat Beriah Magoffin and Opposition nominee
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Joshua Bell. Both candidates argued that they would protect the institution.471 Democrats
even invoked the memory of Henry Clay to attract Opposition supporters and Magoffin
claimed that he and Clay were great friends.472 Bell dismissed his opponent’s assertions
while George Prentice scoffed at the “hypocrisy” of Clay’s former political enemies now
singing his praises.473 But Clay symbolized loyalty to the Union, and both parties invoked
his name to convey their allegiance to the country rather than section. The Opposition
Party’s strategy of splitting the Democrats worked reasonably well, but it failed to assure
their victory at the ballot box. Despite the anti-Democratic coalition, the Democrats still
prevailed in the state and Kentucky voters elected Democratic Magoffin by a vote of
76,187 to 67,283 over Bell.
As Kentucky voters focused on questions of Union and slavery rather than
nativism and immigration, mob assaults shifted from immigrants to “slave agitators” by
the end of the 1850s. When John Brown’s October 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry fired
southern suspicions of antislavery advocates, Kentuckians turned violent.474 In the week
of Brown’s attack, furious Kentuckians drove antislavery reformer John G. Fee and his
Berea supporters out of the state. The slavery issue also became the central legislative
focus of the state. In late 1859, hoping to increase the supply of slaves in the state,
lawmakers repealed a 1833 law restricting the importation of slaves into Kentucky.475
The repeal flew directly in the face of Opposition arguments against slavery agitation,
and most party members voted against it. Democratic support, however, assured its
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passage. Reflecting southerners’ growing anxiety, lawmakers also rejected a proposed
bridge between Covington and Cincinnati because Ohio “failed to approve stringent
clauses designed to prevent slave escapes.”476
By 1860, the nation stood at a tipping point. The sectional strains proved too
strong for the Democratic Party, which split into two camps. Meeting in Charleston in
April 1860, the Democratic convention ended in deadlock and turmoil. While northern
delegates felt Stephen Douglas offered their best chance of defeating Republicans,
southern delegates castigated Douglas as a traitor due to his avocation of popular
sovereignty, which enabled territories to choose slavery or free labor. Six weeks later,
northern and some remaining Upper South delegates chose Douglas, while a separate
convention of Southern Democrats nominated Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge as the
best champion of their interests. Meeting in Chicago, Republicans nominated Abraham
Lincoln, a onetime Whig congressman from Illinois best known for his debates against
Douglas in the Illinois senate race of 1858. In choosing Lincoln, Republicans hoped to
maintain their 1856 coalition, while adding the remaining free states. With fear of a
Republican victory growing, many Kentuckians, including former Whigs, Know
Nothings, and disgruntled Democrats, rallied under the “Constitutional Union” banner.
Advocating preservation of the Union and rejecting northern “radicalism,” the
Constitutional Union ticket, headed by wealthy slave owner Senator John Bell of
Tennessee, proved especially popular in Upper South states. Even southern Democrats,
rallying around Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge, employed Constitutional Union
arguments. On the day before the election, the Democratic Louisville Courier, voicing
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support for Breckinridge, argued that the victory of their candidate would “bring peace
and quiet to the Union . . . fresh impulse to industry and trade . . . and patriotic effort to
lengthen and strengthen the Union.”477
With Democratic votes splitting between Breckinridge and northern Democrat
Stephen Douglas, the Constitutional Union ticket emerged victorious in Kentucky with
just over 45 percent of the vote. Combined Democratic totals outnumbered Constitutional
Union supporters, with 36 percent of Kentucky voters backing Breckinridge and 17.5
percent casting their vote for Douglas. Still, the Constitutional Union Party claimed
14,180 more votes than Breckinridge and 40,372 more than Douglas, with the latter
candidate failing to carry a single Kentucky county. 478 Lincoln garnered less than 1
percent of Kentucky voters, but he drew overwhelming support in a unified North.
Losing only New Jersey in the North, Lincoln accumulated 180 electoral votes. The
fractured election results indicated that in 1860 the Constitutional Unionists could not
recycle the old Whig and Know Nothing political strategy of appealing to Union to
appease impassioned voters and paper over sectional differences. In the wake of the
Republican victory, states in the Deep South severed ties and seceded from the Union.
The issue of slavery, which had long divided Americans along sectional lines, proved too
important for politicians and voters to ignore. Cast against the sectional mayhem of the
previous four years, nativism had become a relic, brushed into the dustbin of political
history.
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CONCLUSION
THE LEGACY OF KENTUCKY’S KNOW NOTHING PARTY
Despite the party’s short life, the Know Nothings left an indelible impression on the
American political landscape. Effectively destroying the second party system of the
previous two decades, the Know Nothing saga helps explain the collapse of the Whig
Party both nationally and in Kentucky. Further, Know Nothing victories reflected the
pervasiveness of anti-Catholicism and anti-immigrant sentiment in nineteenth-century
America. However, as this thesis argues, Know Nothing sentiments and concerns
extended beyond immigration and religion. As a historiographical contribution, this work
builds upon the foundation laid by Agnes McGann’s 1944 study, Nativism in Kentucky to
1860. Through examining varied works from the past six decades and including related
primary documents, this thesis broadens the study and illuminates concerns expressed by
party members beyond nativism. Additionally, this work reveals the complex attempt by
Old Whigs to maintain power through the Know Nothing Party in Kentucky, as well as
the pushback from fervent party members.
Though their coalition proved successful for only a brief period, the Know
Nothings’ story adds significant detail to historians’ understanding of both Civil War-era
politics and the history of American nativism.479 Overshadowed by the end of the 1850s,
the nativist cause faded as the threat of Civil War overhauled the national discourse.
Following the 1860 election, Kentucky’s Whig and Know Nothing heritage played a
479
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pivotal role in the state. During the secession crisis, most Kentuckians clung to an older
view of the Union unlike their southern peers. While the majority of Kentuckians still
supported the institution of slavery, they believed secession unnecessary. In the months
following Lincoln’s presidential victory, Kentucky maintained its neutrality longer than
any state.480 Benefiting from a resilient pre-war party organization that grew out of the
Whigs and Know Nothings and their strong Louisville base, Kentucky Unionists
prevailed in the 1861 election for a special state convention, garnering the majority of
seats statewide and sweeping elections in Louisville.
During the Civil War, Jefferson County, once the hotbed of Know Nothing Party
activity, produced the most Union Army volunteers (6,578) of any Kentucky county.
Although some secessionists lived in Louisville, the city experienced no public disorder
associated with disunion, unlike the fellow border state cities such as Baltimore and St.
Louis, where secessionist minorities attempted to take power by force of arms.481 Even
when the Confederate Army approached the city in the summer of 1862, Louisville’s
southern sympathizers failed to challenge Unionists openly. While the majority of
Louisville favored the Union, the comparative unity of the political leadership within the
city also prevented the kind of bitter disruptions more volatile areas experienced. After
the Bloody Monday riots of 1855, Louisville civic leaders clamped down on public
disorder more forcefully and reduced the volatility of state elections.482 Kentucky Know
Nothings held local office until 1859, and their firm control of city politics also inhibited
the development of a viable Free Soil Party such as antislavery Germans had forged in St.
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Louis. Consensus among wealthy civic leaders combined with the absence of an
institutional vehicle for secession to challenge the consensus made Louisville’s entry into
the Civil War a more peaceful exercise than in other border cities.483
Symbolizing the state’s volatile politics in the 1850s, Senator John J. Crittenden
effectively switched from loyal Whig to Know Nothing to Opposition Party leader to
Constitutional Union supporter within an eight-year span. Remaining unwavering in their
opposition to the Democratic Party, many Kentuckians followed a similar pattern.
Kentucky’s leading Democrat, Vice President John C. Breckinridge, embarked on a
different path once the Civil War began. Becoming a Confederate general and later the
Confederacy’s fifth and final secretary of war, Breckinridge confirmed for Old Whigs
and Know Nothings their charge that the state’s Democrats cared far more for sectional
ties than national identity. Crittenden’s course also highlights the path taken by other Old
Whigs, who continued to attain power by infiltrating the Know Nothing Party. As
Charles S. Morehead, Humphrey Marshall, and James F. Roberts and other established
Whigs garnered political nominations under the Know Nothing banner, they underplayed
nativist concerns. Instead, they championed traditional Whig interests in continued
opposition to the Democrats. In response, fervent nativists cried foul with some bolting
the party in protest. The infiltration of Kentucky’s Old Whigs into the Know Nothing
camp weakened the party’s coalition, causing objection and consternation from early
Know Nothing adherents.
Though historians have often reduced the discussion of Know Nothings to a brief
anti-immigrant blip on the political radar, the party of the 1850s contained a myriad of
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concerns. Certainly, nativist and anti-Catholic elements of the mid-nineteenth century
played leading roles in the party’s focus and development. However, the former Whig
interests of unionism, public education, and temperance comprised key components of
the Know Nothing platform. Most important, the Know Nothings reflected the inability
of both major parties to speak to the needs and interests of their constituents. Thus, the
Know Nothing upsurge contributed to the collapse of the second party system.
Ultimately, however, the Know Nothing coalition proved too conflicted to cohere as a
national party. Following the Civil War, questions of freedom and equality overtook
national discussion, again pushing nativist arguments to the periphery. By the early
decades of the twentieth century, however, elements of nativism became more
pronounced with new groups as targets. Long after the disintegration of the Know
Nothings as a national political force, their nativist ideology continued to prove both
relevant and cyclical.
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